Tab 1 - Class 2020 NST Imp Report (20200131)

Report to Congress on

Implementation of the New START Treaty

Pursuant to paragraph (a)(10) of the Senate’s Resolution of Advice and Consent

to Ratification of the New START Treaty (Treaty Doc. 111-5)

NEW START TREATY ANNUAL IMPLEMENTATION REPORT

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Introduction

This report is transmitted in response to Condition (a)(10) of the Senate’s

December 22, 2010, Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the

Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on

Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms

(the “New START Treaty”). The New START Treaty was signed in Prague on April

8, 2010, and entered into force on February 5, 2011, upon exchange of the

instruments of ratification.

Condition (a)(10) of the Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the

New START Treaty calls for the President to submit a report to the Committees on

Foreign Relations and Armed Services of the Senate not later than January 31 of

each year, beginning with January 31, 2012, providing:

A. details on each Party’s reductions in strategic offensive arms between

the date the New START Treaty entered into force and December 31,

2011, or, in subsequent reports, during the previous year;

B. a certification that the Russian Federation is in compliance with the

terms of the New START Treaty, or a detailed discussion of any

noncompliance by the Russian Federation;

C. a certification that any conversion and elimination procedures adopted

pursuant to Article VI of the New START Treaty and Part Three of the

Protocol have not resulted in ambiguities that could defeat the object

and purpose of the New START Treaty, or -

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(i) a list of any cases in which a conversion or elimination procedure

that has been demonstrated by Russia within the framework of

the Bilateral Consultative Commission remains ambiguous or does

not achieve the goals set forth in paragraph 2 or 3 of Section I of

Part Three of the Protocol; and

(ii) a comprehensive explanation of the steps the United States has

taken with respect to each such case;

D. an assessment of the operation of the New START Treaty’s transparency

mechanisms, including -

(i) the extent to which either Party encrypted or otherwise impeded

the collection of telemetric information; and

(ii) the extent and usefulness of exchanges of telemetric information;

and

E. an assessment of whether a strategic imbalance exists that endangers

the national security interests of the United States.

On November 2, 2011, the President delegated authority to submit the Condition

(a)(10) Report to the Secretary of State. On December 14, 2011, the Secretary of

State delegated this authority to the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control

and International Security. This Report is divided into sections covering each of

the items listed in Condition (a)(10).

A. Details on each Party’s reductions in strategic offensive arms subject to

the New START Treaty between January 1, 2022, and December 31, 2022.

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Below are each Party’s aggregate numbers of strategic offensive arms as of

September 1, 2022, as drawn from the exchange of data by the Parties.

NEW START TREATY

AGGREGATE NUMBERS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

Category of Data United States of America Russian Federation

Deployed Intercontinental

Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs),

Deployed Submarine-Launched

Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), and

Deployed Heavy Bombers

659 540

Warheads on Deployed ICBMs,

on Deployed SLBMs, and Nuclear

Warheads Counted for Deployed

Heavy Bombers

1,420 1,549

Deployed and Non-deployed

Launchers of ICBMs, Deployed

and Non-deployed Launchers of

SLBMs, and Deployed and Non-

deployed Heavy Bombers

800 759

The New START Treaty obligates the Parties to reduce and limit their forces

so that seven years after entry into force of the Treaty, that is, by February

5, 2018, and for the remaining duration of the Treaty, each Party’s

aggregate numbers of strategic offensive arms as counted in accordance

with the Treaty do not exceed: 700 for deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs,

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and deployed heavy bombers; 1,550 for warheads on deployed ICBMs,

warheads on deployed SLBMs, and nuclear warheads counted for deployed

heavy bombers; and 800 for deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers,

deployed and non-deployed SLBM launchers, and deployed and non-

deployed heavy bombers.

B. Certification that the Russian Federation is in compliance with the terms

of the New START Treaty, or a detailed discussion of any noncompliance

by the Russian Federation.

Based on the information available as of December 31, 2022, the United

States cannot certify the Russian Federation to be in compliance with the

terms of the New START Treaty. In refusing to permit the United States to

conduct inspection activities on Russian territory, based on an invalid

invocation of the “temporary exemption” provision, Russia has failed to

comply with its obligation to facilitate U.S. inspection activities, and denied

the United States its right to conduct such inspection activities. The Russian

Federation has also failed to comply with the obligation to convene a

session of the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) within the timeline

set out by the Treaty.

The United States also has a concern regarding Russian compliance with the

New START Treaty warhead limit. This concern stems from Russia’s

noncompliance with its obligation to facilitate inspection activities, coupled

with its close proximity to the New START Treaty warhead limit. The

continued lack of U.S. inspection activities in Russia poses a threat to the

U.S. ability to adequately verify Russian compliance with the treaty limit on

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deployed warheads. As a result of Russia’s close proximity to the warhead

limit in its September 2022 data update and our inability to spot-check the

accuracy of Russian warhead declarations, the United States is unable to

make a determination that Russia remained in compliance throughout 2022

with its obligation to limit its warheads on deployed delivery vehicles

subject to the New START Treaty to 1,550. While this is a serious concern,

it is not a determination of noncompliance. Additionally, the United States

assesses that Russia did not engage in significant activity above the Treaty

limits in 2022. The United States also assesses that Russia was likely under

the New START warhead limit at the end of 2022.

While the United States cannot certify that the Russian Federation is in

compliance with the terms of the New START Treaty, it does not determine,

per Condition (a)(1) of the Senate’s Resolution of Advice and Consent to

Ratification of the New START Treaty, that Russia’s noncompliance

specified in this report threatens the national security interests of the

United States.

Refusal to Permit U.S. Inspection Activities on Russian Territory

Noncompliance Finding: The United States concludes that Russia is not in

compliance with its obligation to facilitate inspection activities under

paragraph 1 of Section I of Part Five of the Protocol to the Treaty, and is

denying the United States its Article XI right to conduct such inspection

activities, because Russia has refused to permit such activities at any

facilities on its territory in reliance on an invalid invocation of paragraph 5

of Section I of Part Five of the Protocol to the Treaty.

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Paragraph 5 of Section I of Part Five of the Protocol to the Treaty provides a

limited right to temporarily exempt appropriate facilities from inspection

activities in exceptional cases for purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty.

In August 2022, Russia invoked the provision to purportedly exempt all of

its treaty facilities from inspection activities and refused a duly notified U.S.

inspection on this basis. Russia’s purported exemption of all of its treaty

facilities from inspection activities remained in place as of the end of 2022.

Russia’s use of the provision here is incompatible with its intended meaning

and use. This issue is discussed in more detail below.

The United States also concludes that Russia’s resumption of facilitating

U.S. inspection activities, in accordance with the terms of the Treaty, would

bring Russia back into compliance with these provisions and remedy the

noncompliance.

Background: P

aragraph 1 of Article XI of the Treaty states

For

the purpose of confirming the accuracy of declared data on

strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty and ensuring

verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each

party shall have the right to conduct inspection activities in

accordance with this Article and Part Five of the Protocol to this

Treaty.

Paragraph 1 of Section I of Part Five of the Protocol to the Treaty states

that:

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For the purpose of helping to ensure verification of compliance with

the provisions of the Treaty, each Party shall facilitate the conduct of

inspection activities by the other Party in accordance with the

provisions of this Part.

Beginning in March 2020, the United States and the Russian Federation

coordinated a mutual and voluntary pause of inspection activities under the

New START Treaty due to the COVID-19 pandemic. In June 2021, the

United States initiated correspondence in an attempt to reach a mutual

understanding on the resumption of inspection activities. Since that time

and despite two in-person bilateral meetings, numerous calls, and an

extensive exchange of papers, Russia has only increased the number of its

ostensible COVID-19 requirements and additional preconditions it claimed

to require before assenting to the resumption of inspection activities.

In June 2022, the United States, judging that the remaining issues related to

the resumption of inspection activities were manageable under the terms

of the Treaty, chose not to continue the mutual pause. The Russian side

took no action to propose extending the pause in inspection activities

before it lapsed. On August 8, 2022, the United States transmitted to

Russia a treaty notification of intent to conduct an inspection. On August 9,

2022, Russia responded by “temporarily exempting” from inspection

activities all of its facilities that are subject to New START Treaty inspection

activities, citing paragraph 5 of Section I of Part Five of the Protocol to the

Treaty, which states:

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In exceptional cases, and for purposes not inconsistent with the

Treaty, the inspected Party may temporarily exempt from inspection

activities appropriate facilities subject to Type One or Type Two

inspections and appropriate facilities at which exhibitions are to be

conducted.

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) issued a public statement

regarding Russia’s rationale for invoking this Treaty provision and provided

a diplomatic note to the United States elaborating on the reasons for its

actions. The Russian MFA publicly stated, “Russia was forced to resort to

this measure as a result of Washington’s persistent desire to implicitly

achieve a restart of inspection activities on conditions that do not take into

account existing realities, create unilateral advantages for the United States

and effectively deprive the Russian Federation of the right to carry out

inspections on American soil.” While Russia cited “incomplete” work

between the United States and Russia regarding protocol for COVID-19

precautions during New START inspection activities, its rationale for

invoking paragraph 5 of Section I of Part Five of the Protocol to the Treaty

centered on Russian grievances regarding U.S. and other countries’

measures imposed on Russia in response to its unprovoked, full-scale

invasion of Ukraine.

The United States subsequently informed Russia that it would not conduct

the notified inspection activity and expressed concern about Russia’s

invocation of the “temporary exemption” provision. As of December 31,

2022, Russia had not rescinded its purported “exemption” of all of its treaty

facilities from inspection activities. The United States sought to discuss its

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concerns about Russia’s “temporary exemption” at a session of the BCC

scheduled for November 29, which Russia unilaterally postponed four days

before the session’s scheduled start date. Russia subsequently refused to

reschedule.

Compliance Analysis: T

he “temporary exemption” provision was intended

to apply when specific conditions at a specific facility or facilities make it

difficult for the inspected party to host an inspection at that facility or

facilities for a finite period of time tied to those specific conditions at each

specific facility. Notably, the article-by-article analysis that the U.S.

Executive Branch submitted to the Senate together with the New START

Treaty states (emphasis added):

e Parties agreed that this provision was necessary in order to

preclude inspections at facilities that were involved in contingency

operations important to the national security interests of the

Parties unrelated to the U.S.-Russian strategic relationship. The

Parties also agreed that such exemptions should be infrequent and

would only be employed for purposes not inconsistent with the

Treaty. Examples of such circumstances include, but are not limited

to, the involvement of an air base in support of on-going military

operations or substantial damage and disruption of a facility due to a

natural disaster.

Russia’s purported reliance on this provision in the circumstances

presented here is not consistent with the provision’s intended meaning and

use. Russia invoked the provision to refuse U.S. inspection activities at all

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facilities on Russian territory until the resolution of an alleged, though

unsubstantiated, “inequality” between the two countries relating to the

U.S. and international response to Russian military aggression against

Ukraine. In invoking the “temporary exemption” provision, Russia has not

cited any specific conditions at any specific facilities. Instead, Russia has

publicly attempted to justify its blanket exemption by citing broader

Russian grievances in the bilateral strategic relationship and Russia’s

relationship with U.S. allies and partners. Thus, Russia’s current reliance on

the provision is not predicated on any particular impediment to permitting

inspection activities at specific Russian facilities.

Russia’s explanation of its invocation of the exemption includes several

rationales that are inconsistent with the intended use of this Treaty

provision.

Russia claims that it cannot exercise its inspection rights and that it

therefore must deny U.S. inspection activities to avoid suffering a unilateral

disadvantage under the New START Treaty. Russia’s claim of being unable

to exercise its inspection rights in the United States is false. The United

States has repeatedly informed Russia that the United States is prepared to

fulfill its obligation to facilitate Russian inspection activities on U.S.

territory. Contrary to Russia’s claim that Russian inspectors cannot travel

to the United States to conduct inspections, Russian inspectors can in fact

travel to the United States via commercial flights or authorized inspection

airplanes. There are no impediments arising from U.S. sanctions that would

prevent Russia’s full exercise of its inspection rights under the Treaty. The

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United States has been extremely clear with the Russian Federation on this

point.

Russia’s military and foreign policy grievances, including those related to

U.S. support for Ukraine, similarly fail to provide a sound basis for Russia’s

invocation of the exemption provision. The U.S. article-by-article analysis

indicates that the provision’s intent was to permit exemption of facilities

from inspection activities in order to safeguard national security interests

“unrelated to the U.S.-Russian strategic relationship.” Russia’s desire to

respond to broader grievances with the United States over Ukraine by

keeping the United States from inspecting Russian facilities is not a

“purpose not inconsistent with the Treaty,” and runs counter to the intent

of the Parties, as described in the article-by-article analysis.

Lastly, Russia also claims that its use of this provision is justified because of

unresolved issues “related to the resumption of inspection activities under

the New START Treaty in the context of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.”

The unresolved issues Russia references center on differing views about

COVID-19 precautions and protocols. This element of Russia’s justification

also lacks merit. The political commitment to pause inspection activities

was a voluntary, time-bound measure and was never contingent upon

mutual agreement or acceptance of COVID-19 protocols. Furthermore,

there is no basis in paragraph 5 of Section I of Part Five of the Protocol to

the Treaty for exempting facilities from inspection activities due to

disagreements over protocols for mitigating infectious diseases or

responding to medical issues during inspection activities. The exercise of

the inspection rights under the New START Treaty is not contingent upon a

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new mutual agreement or understanding on COVID-19 issues. The Treaty

text as written already provides sufficient protocol and flexibility for

contingencies that may arise with respect to COVID-19 during inspection

activities.

The provisions in the New START Treaty are legally binding and

implementation of COVID-19 protocols during inspection activities must

remain consistent with these provisions. Both sides have an obligation to

provide medical treatment, as necessary, to the other’s personnel during

inspection activities. Per paragraph 7(f) of Section II of Part Five of the

Protocol to the Treaty, “without prejudice to the privileges and immunities

provided for this paragraph, inspectors and aircrew members shall be

obliged to respect the laws and regulations of the inspected party.” The

United States has repeatedly expressed its willingness to adhere to Russia’s

COVID-19 requirements in a manner consistent with U.S. rights under the

New START Treaty. Perhaps most relevant to Russia’s unresolved COVID-19

issues, paragraph 5 of Section IX of Part Five of the Protocol establishes

rights and obligations for interrupting and canceling inspection activities for

reasons of personnel security and equipment safety. The parties designed

this provision to provide both sides the flexibility to ensure the safety of all

individuals involved in inspection activities without compromising the

inspecting party’s inspection rights and without placing an undue

operational burden on the inspected party. This provision provides the

applicable framework for handling the emergence of COVID-19 symptoms

and positive COVID-19 tests among personnel on the inspection and escort

teams.

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The United States sought to establish a mutual and voluntary treaty-

consistent understanding with Russia on COVID-19 precautions and

protocols in order to increase the prospects for an efficient resumption of

inspection activities following the expiration of the political commitment to

pause inspection activities. The sides made some progress on these issues,

but Russia prevented further progress by unilaterally and abruptly

postponing the November 2022 BCC session scheduled to address both

sides’ priority issues, including the issue of the resumption of inspection

activities. Russia’s compliance with obligations relating to the BCC is

addressed in the following section.

Russia’s Refusal to Meet in the BCC

Noncompliance Finding: The Russian Federation failed to comply with the

obligation under paragraph 2 of Section III of Part Six of the Protocol to the

Treaty regarding convening a session of the BCC within the timeline set out

by the Treaty.

Background: Article XII of the New START Treaty states: “To promote the

objectives and implementation of the provisions of this treaty, the Parties

hereby establish the Bilateral Consultative Commission, the authority and

procedures for the operation of which are set forth in Part Six of the

Protocol to this Treaty.” Paragraph 2 of Section III of Part Six of the

Protocol to the Treaty states: “A session of the BCC shall be convened not

later than 45 days after the date proposed in the request provided for in

paragraph 1 of this Section.”

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In the spring of 2022, the United States and Russia mutually agreed to

postpone the spring session of the BCC. During the following months, the

United States sought to reach an understanding with Russia to convene the

BCC at the earliest possible date. In October 2022, Russia proposed

convening a BCC in Cairo on November 29, 2022; the United States

accepted the proposed date and location.

On November 25, 2022, Russia informed the United States that it was

unilaterally postponing the scheduled BCC session for “technical reasons.”

In subsequent public statements, Russian officials have explained that the

postponement was intended to send a political signal about Russian

objections to U.S. military support for Ukraine and as a reaction to

purported U.S. unwillingness to discuss Russia’s New START Treaty

implementation concerns at the BCC.

Compliance Analysis: The United States accepted Russia’s proposed

November 29, 2022, start date for BCC-XX. Russia unilaterally postponed

the session and, despite U.S. requests, refused to provide alternate dates to

convene the session by January 13, 2023, 45 days after the initially

proposed start date. Russia’s rationale for this continued postponement

was again disagreements in the broader U.S.-Russia relationship. However,

there is no provision in the New START Treaty to excuse a failure to

convene a BCC session within 45 days of its proposed start date on such a

basis. Contrary to Russian public statements, the United States was

prepared to engage constructively on all BCC agenda items, including items

Russia proposed and prioritized.

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Deployed Warhead Limit

Compliance Concern: Because of Russia’s noncompliance with its obligation

to facilitate inspection activities, the United States has less confidence in

the accuracy of Russia’s declarations regarding the number of warheads on

deployed ICBMs, warheads on deployed SLBMs, and nuclear warheads

counted for deployed heavy bombers during 2022. In Russia’s most recent

data update, as of September 1, 2022, it declared 1,549 treaty-accountable

warheads. This warhead declaration is only one under 1,550 and is closer

to the limit than any of Russia’s previous declarations since the New START

warhead limit took effect on February 5, 2018. As a result of Russia’s close

proximity to the warhead limit and our inability to spot-check the accuracy

of Russian warhead declarations, the United States is unable to make a

determination that Russia remained in compliance throughout 2022 with

its obligation to limit its deployed warheads on delivery vehicles subject to

the New START Treaty to 1,550. While this is a serious concern, it is not a

determination of noncompliance. Additionally, the United States assesses

that Russia did not engage in significant activity above the Treaty limits in

2022. The United States also assesses that Russia was likely under the New

START warhead limit at the end of 2022.

Background: Article II(b) of the New START Treaty limits the warheads on

deployed ICBMs, warheads on deployed SLBMs, and nuclear warheads

counted for deployed heavy bombers to 1,550. The New START Treaty

obligates the United States and Russia to declare and count toward the

numerical limit warheads on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs (and each

deployed heavy bomber subject to the Treaty counts as one warhead

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toward the 1,550 limit). For ICBMs and SLBMs, the number of warheads is

the number of reentry vehicles emplaced on deployed ICBMs and on

deployed SLBMs.

The New START Treaty verification regime includes several measures to

strengthen each side’s ability to assess the other’s compliance with the

deployed warhead limit. Twice a year in data updates, each side must

declare the number of total deployed warheads that count toward the

1,550 limit, the number of warheads on deployed delivery vehicles at each

ICBM base and submarine base subject to inspection, the total number of

warheads on deployed ICBMs, and the total number of warheads on

deployed SLBMs. As part of a Type One inspection, the inspected party

must declare the number of reentry vehicles on each deployed ICBM and

deployed SLBM present at the ICBM base or submarine base subject to the

inspection. The inspecting party then selects one missile at the inspected

base and visually confirms the actual number of reentry vehicles declared

on it.

Conducting ten such visual spot checks year after year under the New

START Treaty has increased U.S. confidence in its assessments of the

accuracy of Russian warhead data declarations. Russia has not known in

advance which bases and which specific missiles the United States would

select during its ten Type One inspections per year. Additionally, the

potential risk of U.S. detection of Russian inaccurate declarations during

Type One inspections may have helped deter Russia from issuing false

warhead declarations due to the risk of being caught during a spot check.

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In 2022, the United States did not conduct any New START Treaty

inspection activities, despite attempting to do so in August 2022, at which

time Russia purported to exempt all its facilities from inspection activities.

Compliance Analysis: Russia’s close proximity to the limit in 2022, coupled

with the continued lack of onsite inspection activities, constitutes a serious

compliance concern. Because of Russia’s close proximity to the warhead

limit, Type One inspections would have been uniquely valuable for verifying

Russian compliance with its Article II(b) obligation in 2022. Had Russia

permitted the resumption of inspection activities in August 2022, the

United States would have had the opportunity to conduct up to 10 Type

One inspections to confirm the accuracy of Russian warhead data

declarations on missiles designated for inspection. If the number of reentry

vehicles on the inspected missiles matched the number Russia declared for

those missiles, U.S. confidence in the accuracy of Russian warhead

declarations would have increased.

Other Implementation Concerns

Certain other technical concerns and implementation-related issues remain

under discussion with the Russian Federation through diplomatic channels

and in the context of the BCC; however, those discussions did not occur in

2022 as a result of Russia’s refusal to convene a session of the BCC.

The New START Treaty established the BCC to promote the objectives and

implementation of the provisions of the Treaty. This forum for resolving

questions relating to implementation and compliance consists of members

from both the United States and Russian Federation.

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Concerns that remain unresolved and under discussion are described in the

classified version of this report for 2021.

C. Certification that any conversion and elimination procedures adopted

pursuant to Article VI of the New START Treaty and Part Three of the

Protocol have not resulted in ambiguities that could defeat the object and

purpose of the New START Treaty, or –

(i) a list of any cases in which a conversion or elimination procedure

that has been demonstrated by Russia within the framework of the

Bilateral Consultative Commission remains ambiguous or does not

achieve the goals set forth in paragraph 2 or 3 of Section I of Part

Three of the Protocol; and

(ii) a comprehensive explanation of the steps the United States has

taken with respect to each such case.

During the course of this reporting period (January 1, 2022, through

December 31, 2022), no conversion or elimination procedures have been

adopted pursuant to Article VI of the Treaty and Part Three of the Protocol.

D. An assessment of the operation of the New START Treaty’s transparency

mechanisms, including –

(i) the extent to which either Party encrypted or otherwise impeded

the collection of telemetric information; and

(ii) the extent and usefulness of exchanges of telemetric information.

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The New START Treaty provides for the exchange of telemetric information

on an equal number of U.S. and Russian launches of ICBMs and SLBMs, but

no more than five per calendar year. The provisions of the New START

Treaty’s Annex on Telemetric Information state that the Party conducting a

launch of an ICBM or SLBM that it intends to consider for provision of

telemetric information to the other Party shall, in a notification of such a

launch, specify all frequencies and modulation methods to be used to

broadcast telemetric information subject to provision to the other Party.

The Party conducting such launches shall not take any measures to deny

access to the telemetric signal broadcast and shall not encrypt telemetric

information that may be provided to the other Party.

Although no BCC session was convened in the spring of 2022, the two sides

agreed on April 11, 2022, through a decision signed by both BCC

Commissioners, to exchange, in 2022, telemetric information on one launch

of an ICBM or SLBM conducted by each Party during the period from

January 1, 2021, through December 31, 2021. That exchange was

accomplished on June 1, 2022.

For additional assessment of the operation of the New START Treaty’s

transparency mechanisms, please see the classified version of this Report.

E. An assessment of whether a strategic imbalance exists that endangers the

national security interests of the United States.

The United States continues to assess that there is not a strategic

imbalance between the United States and the Russian Federation that

endangers the national security interest of the United States.

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As detailed in the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, the United States retains a

safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal that is sufficient to deter

strategic attack, assure allies and partners, and respond in the event of

adversary attack. Although the United States has less confidence in Russian

warhead declarations in 2022 as a result of Russia preventing the United

States from exercising its right to conduct inspection activities, the New

START Treaty continues to constrain Russian strategic nuclear forces and

provides insight into Russian forces that the United States would not have

without the Treaty. The United States assesses that Russia did not engage

in significant activity above the Treaty limits in 2022.

The United States continues to monitor the strategic implications of

Russia’s development of new kinds of strategic offensive arms.

The United States has made clear its concerns about Russia’s arsenal of

theater-range, or so-called nonstrategic, nuclear weapons. The IC assesses

that Russia’s arsenal of theater-range nuclear weapons comprises 1,000-

2,000 warheads and is likely to grow by an uncertain amount. Theater-

range nuclear weapons have strategic implications because any adversary

use of nuclear weapons, regardless of location or yield, would

fundamentally alter the nature of a conflict and create the potential for

uncontrolled escalation. The United States has repeatedly conveyed these

sentiments to the Russian Federation.

Although the United States suspended the Strategic Stability Dialogue with

Russia in response to Russia’s February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine,

the United States remains committed to the objective of addressing all

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Russian nuclear weapons, including theater-range nuclear weapons, in New

START Treaty follow-on measures. As President Biden stated in written

remarks to the 2022 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference,

“Today, my Administration is ready to expeditiously negotiate a new arms

control framework to replace New START when it expires in 2026. But

negotiation requires a willing partner operating in good faith.” Russia’s

return to compliance with and full implementation of the New START

Treaty would be a critical step toward demonstrating good faith.