36 ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER
RUSSO- AMERICAN
STRATEGIC
NUCLEAR ARMS
CONTROL
New START or a
New Start?
is article considers whether the temporarily iced New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(START) can continue to serve as a fulcrum for the renewal of Russo- American strategic
nuclear arms control. Going forward, the political and military- technical challenges to
rebooting the New START and/or leapfrogging over it are formidable but not insurmount-
able. e article rst considers the existing status of New START and both Russian and
American strategic nuclear forces. Second, it discusses the vefold context of challenges
that face decisionmakers and negotiators in Washington and Moscow, and, although un-
likely, Beijing. ird, the article analyzes the adequacy of New START-compatible forces to
provide for surety in deterrence, crisis, and arms race stability, allowing for various levels
of performance under exigent conditions.
I
n February 2023 Russian President Vladimir Putin announced Russia was sus-
pending participation in the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)
signed by the United States and Russia in 2010. Considering that the treaty had no
measure for such an action, the act eectively equated to withdrawal.
1
Almost a year
later, both nations are looking ahead at future deterrence and arms control. A new or
renewed New START could tame the growth of strategic nuclear arsenals and provide
a measure of deterrence and arms race stability, but this is insucient for the longer
term. Eective treaty negotiations must grapple with challenges, including Russia’s
war in Ukraine; China’s nuclear expansion; the space and cyber domains; new oen-
sive and defensive technologies; and the various concepts of escalation and de-
escalation held by the three powers in question.
Background
New START entered into force in 2011 and was extended by mutual agreement be-
tween Russia and the United States in 2021, until 2026. e treaty limits each state to a
1. Oce of the Spokesperson, Department of State (DoS), “Russian Noncompliance with and Invalid
Suspension of the New START Treaty,” press release, DoS, June 1, 2023, https://www.state.gov/.
Stephen J. Cimbala
adam b. lowther
Dr. Stephen Cimbala is distinguished professor of political science at Penn State University–Brandywine.
Dr. Adam Lowther is the cofounder and vice president of research at the National Institute for Deterrence
Studies and the host of Nuclecast.
Nuclear Deterrence
Cimbala & Lowther
ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 37
maximum of 800 deployed and nondeployed strategic launchers: intercontinental bal-
listic missiles (ICBM), submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), and heavy bomb-
ers. Additionally, each country can deploy a maximum of 700 ICBM and/or SLBM
launchers and heavy bombers, and an upper limit of 1,550 warheads. e treaty also
provided for measures to ensure monitoring and verication of each country’s deploy-
ments, including data updates and exchanges, notications, and on- site inspections.
2
Despite Putin’s 2023 announcement of Russia’s suspended participation in New
START, both states indicated their willingness to continue to observe its numerical limits
on deployed and nondeployed launchers and deployed warheads.
3
is announcement
came at a time when Russia was already in breach of mandatory inspections.
4
e ability of the United States’ “national technical means” to eectively monitor
Russian compliance with New START is imperfect at best.
5
Monitoring the numbers
of warheads deployed on strategic–launchers is the most challenging aspect now be-
cause the on- site inspections called for in the treaty will no longer take place—unless
Russia returns to full participation and compliance.
In response to Russia’s suspension of participation in the treaty, the US State De-
partment announced in June 2023 that the United States would no longer provide no-
tications about the status or location of items accountable under the treaty, would no
longer facilitate inspections on American territory, and would cease providing Russia
with telemetry information from American ICBM and SLBM launches.
6
e absence of regular data exchanges and complete monitoring and verication of
one another’s forces do not pose an immediate danger to the United States or Russia.
In the longer term, if soured relations lead to a deadlocked or nonexistent arms con-
trol dialogue, both the United States and Russia could lose condence in the arms
control process and resume force building on the basis of their worst fears about what
the other side is doing or might do in the future. American ocials have indicated a
willingness to keep an open door to further discussions on these issues, but these ef-
forts are taking place at a time when the Department of Defense’s recently released
annual report, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of
China (PRC), suggests China may have tripled the size of its nuclear arsenal since
2. Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Oensive Arms, U.S.-Russian Federation (New START), Apr. 8,
2010, Treaty Document 111-5.
3. Guy Falconbridge, “Russia’s Putin Issues New Nuclear Warnings to West over Ukraine,” Reuters,
February 21, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/.
4. Humeyra Pamuk, “US Says Russia Violating New START Nuclear Arms Control Treaty,” Reuters,
January 31, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/.
5. Michael P. Gleason and Luc Reisbeck, Noninterference with National Technical Means: e Status
Quo Will Not Survive (Washington, DC: Aerospace Corporation, 2020), 1–4.
6. Steven Pifer, “e US and Russia Must Re- Assess eir Strategic Relations in a World without New
START,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June 13, 2023, https://thebulletin.org/.
38 VOL. 2, NO. 4, WINTER 2023
Rethinking Russo- American Strategic Nuclear Arms Control
2020 as it builds to a peer arsenal.
7
China’s actions are certain to change the shape of
future arms control.
On June 2, 2023, US national security adviser Jake Sullivan, in a speech to the Arms
Control Association, said that the United States was ready to engage with Russia on
bilateral arms control talks without preconditions in order to “manage nuclear risks
and develop a post-2026 arms control framework.”
8
Russian reactions to this oer
were equivocal. ey also depend, to some extent, on Putin’s willingness to reengage
on nuclear arms control despite continued American and NATO’s opposition to Rus-
sia’s war in Ukraine.
9
Although the United States and Russia both say they are in compliance with the
requirements of New START, there is no guarantee this situation will continue inde-
nitely. Uncertainty about the durability of New START is based on several factors.
First, the war in Ukraine already shows signs of being a protracted struggle that will
dampen enthusiasm for further collaboration on security and foreign policy issues.
Second, there is signicant support among arms control and foreign policy experts for
including the PRC in any future strategic nuclear arms control agreement. As men-
tioned above, the PRC is engaged in building a nuclear force peer to the United
States.
10
is would increase American extended deterrence requirements in Asia in
addition to those already existing in Europe.
ird, the challenge of deterring nuclear attack involves more than maintaining
strategic parity in force- building. e rising signicance of the cyber and space do-
mains as related to nuclear deterrence requires further consideration among defense
leaders and policy planners. Fourth, technological innovations in oensive strike
weapons and antimissile defenses may complicate American and Russian estimates of
“how much is enough” for deterrence and crisis stability. A h issue is whether
American and Russian notions of the role of nuclear weapons in military strategy, es-
pecially with regard to escalation, are correctly understood or compatible in the event
that deterrence fails.
Five Challenges for Future Arms Control
Russia’s War in Ukraine
e rst challenge to the issue of future arms control is the protracted nature of
Russia’s war in Ukraine. With the conclusion of the war dicult to foresee, any of the
7. Oce of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Develop-
ments Involving the People’s Republic of China (Washington, DC: DoD, 2023), VIII.
8. OSD.
9. See Michaela Dodge, “On Arms Control and Why New START’s Suspension Does Not Really Matter,”
National Institute for Public Policy (NIPP), June 19, 2023, https://nipp.org/.
10. See Brad Roberts et al., China’s Emergence as a Second Nuclear Peer: Implications for U.S. Nuclear
Deterrence Strategy (Livermore, CA: US Department of Energy, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory,
2023), https://cgsr.llnl.gov/.
Cimbala & Lowther
ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 39
possible outcomes can complicate future Russo- American political relations. e
options, broadly speaking, are a decisive victory for Russia, a decisive victory for
Ukraine, or a split decision that leaves both sides with some signicant payos but
perhaps less than their maximum objectives.
Any negotiated settlement will involve side payments, trade- os, and some dis-
gruntlement on the part of governing elites, interest groups, media pundits, and others
in Kyiv, Moscow, Washington, and Brussels. For example, Russia might have to settle
for the loss of some previously occupied territory in eastern and southern Ukraine.
Ukraine might have to accept Russia’s foothold on a land bridge to Crimea. International
mediation would almost certainly be required, perhaps on the part of the United Nations,
the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and/or other key state
actors such as China.
A possible sticking point to a mutually acceptable cease- re, or to a more durable
peace agreement, would be the admission of Ukraine to NATO. Member states in
NATO and others are promoting this idea in public discourse, but it is a nonstarter for
Putin.
11
e admission of Ukraine into NATO could lead to the fall of the Putin re-
gime and to a worse option.
12
Additionally, if Ukrainian armed forces appear on the
cusp of retaking Crimea, this is a red line for Russia, and it may see a total deteriora-
tion of relations between Moscow and Washington. NATO leaders should not assume
that turbulence within the Russian regime works to NATO’s advantage.
13
Peace agree-
ments have to be implemented by stable governments, not by those who are distracted
and looking over their shoulders at their possible replacement.
China
A second issue is the participation of Beijing in strategic arms control agreements.
China’s rising political inuence and economic power are now being mated to a grow-
ing nuclear arsenal and make its participation necessary. Moreover, Chinese military
improvements are not only in the realm of growing force size. China’s capabilities for
high- end conventional warfare and for nuclear deterrence are also qualitatively im-
proved compared to those of the pre- Xi Jinping era.
e Defense Department’s 2023 annual report details expansion in numbers and
system capabilities that are shocking when compared to past reports and the ex-
pected growth in China’s capability.
14
e PRC also plans to challenge the United
States in foundational technologies such as articial intelligence (AI), space oense
and defense, cyberwar, and hypersonic weapons. China’s growing arsenal of nuclear
11. Robert Pszczel, “e Consequences of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine for International Security–
NATO and Beyond,” NATO Review, July 7, 2022, https://www.nato.int/.
12. Jim Heinz, “Putin Is Expected to Seek Reelection in Russia, but Who Would Run If He Doesn’t?,”
AP [Associated Press], November 1, 2023, https://apnews.com/.
13. Alexander Motyl, “It’s High Time to Prepare for Russia’s Collapse,” Foreign Policy, January 7, 2023,
https://foreignpolicy.com/.
14. OSD, Annual Report.
40 VOL. 2, NO. 4, WINTER 2023
Rethinking Russo- American Strategic Nuclear Arms Control
weapons includes launchers of intercontinental reach as well as those designed for a
regional conict.
Notwithstanding the urgency of bringing the PRC into nuclear arms control dis-
cussions with the United States and Russia, there are obstacles to three- way agree-
ments. First, China may resist entering into any negotiations of this type until it has
built up its strategic nuclear forces to higher levels.
15
China does not necessarily need
to duplicate the nuclear forces of the United States or Russia. It appears the PRC is
seeking to eld a nuclear arsenal that matches or exceeds the United States with re-
spect to a survivable second- strike capability, a plurality of delivery systems, and the
necessary supporting elements for a credible strategic nuclear deterrent, including
nuclear warning and command, control, and communications (C3) systems, space-
based assets, and cyber capabilities.
16
China will also want to deploy nuclear retaliatory forces that can circumvent any
antimissile defenses that the United States might deploy, fearing that otherwise, the
credibility of its nuclear deterrent will be compromised.
17
A second concern about PRC participation in nuclear arms control talks is its nega-
tive attitude toward transparency in disclosing information about its currently de-
ployed forces and modernization plans.
18
Chinese leadership and military advisers
may nd the transparency to which the United States and Russia have become accus-
tomed, as a result of participation in Cold War and post- Cold War arms control, anti-
thetical to their concepts of international negotiation and national security. Attaining
agreements to detailed on- site inspections, data exchanges, test notications, and the
like, may require the United States and Russia to engage their Chinese military and
political counterparts on the PRC’s understandings about military strategy and arms
competition in a broader sense.
Space and Cyber Domains
A third complication in the way of forward progress in nuclear arms control nego-
tiations between the United States and Russia lies in the growing signicance of the
space and cyber domains for military strategy and deterrence. e space and cyber
domains are no longer the provinces of a few technology enthusiasts or dedicated
futurists. Space and cyber assets are critical for the United States, Russia, China, and
other states aspiring to major-power status. Space- based reconnaissance and surveil-
lance, early warning, C3, and geolocation are necessary elements for any advancing
major military power, with or without nuclear weapons.
15. David C. Logan, “Trilateral Arms Control: A Realistic Assessment of Chinese Participation,” Stimson
Center, August 9, 2021, https://www.stimson.org/.
16. See OSD, Annual Report.
17. Timothy Wright, “Is China Gliding toward a FOBS Capability?,” IISS [International Institute for
Strategic Studies], October 22, 2021, https://www.iiss.org/.
18. Walter Lohman and Justin Rhee, eds., 2021 China Transparency Report (Washington, DC: Heritage
Foundation, 2021), 51–59, https://www.heritage.org/.
Cimbala & Lowther
ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 41
Future military space forces will be challenged to perform the functions of sanctuary,
survivability, control, and dominance of the high ground, including decisive space- to-
space and space- to- earth force application.
19
At the same time, technology is provid-
ing new capabilities for attacks on satellites at various orbits and for defense against
the same. e United States, Russia, and China are developing and testing satellites for
rendezvous and proximity operations, enabling satellites to approach close enough to
other satellites to track, repair, and/or destroy them if necessary.
20
Counterspace capabilities are not new, but there are now increasing incentives for
the development and use of oensive counterspace capabilities. Multiple countries are
developing counterspace capabilities across one or more of the following categories:
direct ascent, co- orbital, electronic warfare, directed energy, and space situational
awareness.
21
e United States has tested technologies for close approach and rendezvous in
both low Earth orbit and geosynchronous orbit in addition to tracking, targeting, and
intercept technologies that could lead to a co- orbital intercept capability.
22
e United
States does not have an acknowledged, operational direct- ascent antisatellite capabil-
ity, but American midcourse ballistic missile defense interceptors were demonstrated
in an antisatellite role against a satellite in low Earth orbit. e United States also has
an operational electronic warfare oensive counterspace system, the Counter Com-
munications System, which is globally deployed to provide uplink jamming against
geostationary communications satellites.
23
e United States has also conducted research and development on the use of
ground- based high- energy lasers for counterspace and other missions. Currently, it has
the most advanced space situational awareness system in the world, including for mili-
tary applications. Such capabilities include a geographically dispersed network of
ground- based radars and telescopes and space- based assets.
24
Institutionally, then-
President Donald Trump established the US Space Force and reestablished US Space
Command in 2019 as part of a more intensive focus on space as a warghting domain.
25
19. Peter Hays, “e Space Force in Context” (presentation, Nonproliferation Policy Education Center,
Arlington, VA, May 12, 2023).
20. See Brian Weeden, US Military and Intelligence Rendezvous and Proximity Operations (Washing-
ton, DC: Secure World Foundation, 2023).
21. Tyler Way, “Counterspace Weapons 101,” Aerospace Security, Center for Strategic and Interna-
tional Security (CSIS), June 14, 2022, https://aerospace.csis.org/.
22. Brian Weeden and Victoria Samson, eds., Global Counterspace Capabilities: An Open- Source As-
sessment (Washington, DC: Secure World Foundation, April 2023), vii, https://swfound.org/.
23. Kyle Mizokami, “US Space Force’s First Oensive Weapon Is a Satellite Jammer,” Popular Mechanics,
March 17, 2020, https://www.popularmechanics.com/.
24. Hays, “Space Force.”
25. eresa Hitchens, “NORTHCOM’s Head Sets Record Straight on Missile Defense Boundaries with
SPACECOM,” Breaking Defense, June 16, 2023, https://breakingdefense.com/.
42 VOL. 2, NO. 4, WINTER 2023
Rethinking Russo- American Strategic Nuclear Arms Control
War in space is a possibility, but cyberwar among state and nonstate actors already
poses a signicant danger to international security.
26
Cyberattacks occur as solo ex-
cursions or as supplements to kinetic uses of force. Both the public and private sectors
are vulnerable to cyberwar, and the possibility of a crippling attack against American
infrastructure, including military forces and command- and- control systems, requires
constant vigilance and upgrading of information systems.
In the event of a nuclear rst strike on the United States, the attack will likely be
preceded by cyberattacks against American early warning and nuclear C3 systems
(NC3) in order to introduce confusion or paralysis—delaying or forestalling an eec-
tive response. Cyberattacks directed at government or private sector targets in the
United States and other countries include ransomware, network inltration, insertion
of malware to corrupt digital control systems, and extraction of condential les for
espionage.
27
With regard to nuclear infrastructure, cyberattacks against Iran’s nuclear program
caused the destruction of many centrifuges, and “le of launch” techniques have alleg-
edly been used by the United States in attempts to disable or divert adversary nuclear
missile launches. In addition, breaches of internal security like the Edward Snowden
aair made available to foreign powers some of the most sensitive cyber weapons used
by the National Security Agency. In 2016, the so- called Shadow Brokers posted online
tools used by the agency’s highly classied Tailored Access Operations unit to break
into computer networks in Russia, China, Iran, and elsewhere.
28
American capabilities for oensive cyberwar are second to none, but defenses
against enemy cyberattack are a larger challenge since American civilian infrastruc-
ture contains so many potentially vulnerable targets.
29
One example is the electric
grid. Another issue with respect to cyberwar is the potential for AI to raise the bar in
providing tools for military and strategic deception, including in cyberspace.
Deepfakes can simulate politicians, generals, and others announcing decisions or
conducting war games that seem very convincing to large audiences on social media.
AI systems already produce encyclopedias, plays, novels, and other creative works that
were previously the purview of individual artists and scholars. Future declarations of
war by heads of state or announcements of victory by commanding generals are open
to simulation and temporarily may convince large audiences of their validity. In the
26. Andrew Futter, Cyber reats and Nuclear Weapons: New Questions for Command and Control,
Security and Strategy (London: Royal United Service Institute for Defence and Security Studies [RUSI],
2016); and Erik Gartzke and Jon R. Lindsay, “ermonuclear Cyberwar,” Journal of Cybersecurity 3, no. 1
(2017), https://academic.oup.com/.
27. Chad Heitzenrater, “Cyber Attacks Reveal Uncomfortable Truths about U.S. Defenses,” Rand Blog,
September 21, 2023, https://www.rand.org/; and see also CSIS, “Signicant Cyber Incidents since 2006”
(Washington, DC: CSIS, 2023), https://csis- website- prod.s3.amazonaws.com/.
28. David E. Sanger, e Perfect Weapon: War, Sabotage and Fear in the Cyber Age (New York: Crown
Publishers, 2018), 227, 268–79.
29. For a detailed look at cyber operations see Chase Cunningham, Cyber Warfare—Truth, Tactics,
and Strategies (Birmingham, UK: Packt, 2020).
Cimbala & Lowther
ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 43
case of nuclear crisis management, misperceptions of an adversary’s intentions, along
with deceptions by adversary intelligence services, can lead to miscalculated escala-
tion and an outbreak of nuclear war.
30
Innovations in Offensive and Defensive Weapons
A fourth set of complications with respect to the viability of New START or other
nuclear arms control agreements is continuing innovation in oensive and defensive
weapons. For example, the development of hypersonic weapons, including delivery
systems for nuclear warheads, raises serious issues for deterrence and defense plan-
ners.
31
In the case of nuclear deterrence, a reliable second- strike capability is a neces-
sary condition for the success of deterrence by credible threat of retaliatory punishment.
Hypersonics compress the time available for warning and selection of an appropriate
response to an attack.
32
It is conceivable that national leaders might have only a few minutes from the initial
launch detection of an enemy rst strike to the arrival of warheads at their assigned
targets. Under these conditions, leaders fearful of losing their deterrent might be more
willing to authorize preemptive attacks instead of waiting for indisputable conrma-
tion that a nuclear war is underway.
33
An arms race in deploying hypersonic weapons
could also aect conventional deterrence, since intermediate- and medium- range
missiles with hypersonic speeds and maneuverability could inict massive damage
over a wide area within minutes instead of hours or days.
On the other hand, future arms control will have to take into account the improving
capability of antimissile and air defenses.
34
With respect to ballistic missiles, the Cold
War era was marked by a one- sided dominance of oensive systems over defenses.
e United States and other countries have already demonstrated improved missile
defense technologies against missiles of short, medium, and intermediate ranges. Future
missile defense technologies or platforms, including space- based systems, might provide
additional leverage against ballistic missile attacks.
35
Herein looms the possibility of a
race between states in their ability to eld hypersonic oensive weapons, or other
30. See Stephen J. Cimbala and Lawrence J. Korb, “Articial Intelligence: Challenges and Controversies
for US National Security,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June 9, 2023, https://thebulletin.org/.
31. See Stephen J. Cimbala and Adam B. Lowther, “Hypersonic Weapons and Nuclear Deterrence,”
Comparative Strategy 41, no. 3 (April 2022), https://doi.org/; and Stephen Reny, “Nuclear- Armed Hyper-
sonic Weapons and Nuclear Deterrence,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 14, no. 4 (Winter 2020), https://www
.airuniversity.af.edu.
32. Adam Lowther and Curtis McGin, “America Needs a Dead Hand,” War on the Rocks, August 16,
2019, https://warontherocks.com/.
33. R. Harrison Wagner, “Nuclear Deterrence, Counterforce Strategies, and the Incentive to Strike
First,” American Political Science Review 85, no. 3 (1991).
34. Jeremiah Rozman, Integrated Air and Missile Defense in Multi- Domain Operations (Washington,
DC: Association of the United States Army, 2020), 3–9.
35. See Michaela Dodge, Missile Defense Reckoning Is Coming: Will the United States Choose to Be
Vulnerable to All Long- Range Missiles? (Fairfax, VA: NIPP, 2020).
44 VOL. 2, NO. 4, WINTER 2023
Rethinking Russo- American Strategic Nuclear Arms Control
weapons designed to confuse or evade defenses, compared to their ability to improve
missile defenses.
With respect to nuclear deterrence, missile defenses are always challenged by the
fact that even small numbers of nuclear weapons can do historically unprecedented
damage to society. erefore, against the possibility of large- scale nuclear attacks on
the homeland, deterrence by denial remains less dependable than deterrence by credible
threat of retaliatory punishment.
36
On the other hand, defenses that are good enough
to make the calculations of prospective rst strikers more complicated might appeal to
some national leaders and defense planners. Previously discussed le- of- launch tech-
niques for cyber disruption of missile launches might justiably be considered a form
of antimissile defense, although critics might refer to it as a variant of preemption.
American and Russian Nuclear Strategy
A h aspect of the uncertain context for future strategic nuclear arms control is the
challenge of managing policy- prescriptive doctrine and nuclear force planning for es-
calation control if deterrence fails.
37
is is a thorny subject because it involves two
kinds of prospective nuclear use: so- called tactical or nonstrategic nuclear weapons
made available for battleeld use, and limited strikes with strategic nuclear weapons
that purposely aim at high- value military and/or command- and- control targets but
spare cities and other value targets for coercive bargaining and war termination.
Critics sco at the idea of limited nuclear wars as a type of war that both Russia and
China see as possible without expanding to strategic nuclear conict.
38
But, beginning
with the administration of John F. Kennedy, every American president since has
sought to escape the civilization- ending Single Integrated Operational Plan for some-
thing that oers a variety of limited nuclear options for theater or strategic nuclear
war.
39
During the Cold War years, NATO elded a variety of nonstrategic nuclear
weapons deployed in Western Europe on the assumption that NATO conventional
forces were collectively inferior to those of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies.
e situation now is the reverse. NATO holds the commanding heights of ad-
vanced technology conventional warfare, so Russia maintains many more deployed
nonstrategic nuclear weapons than NATO. Estimates of Russian theater nuclear weapons
range from 2,000 to 6,000, on more than a dozen delivery platforms, against 100 to
36. Carl Rehberg, “Integrated Air and Missile Defense: Early Lessons from the Russia- Ukraine War,”
1945 (website), June 10, 2022, https://www.19fortyve.com/.
37. See Madison Estes, Prevailing under the Nuclear Shadow: A New Framework for US Escalation
Management (Washington, DC: CNA [Center for Naval Analyses], 2020).
38. Stephen J. Cimbala and Lawrence J. Korb, “Karaganov’s Case for Russian Nuclear Preemption:
Responsible Strategizing or Dangerous Delusion?,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, August 21, 2023,
https://thebulletin.org/.
39. See Fred Kaplan, e Bomb: Presidents, Generals, and the Secret History of Nuclear War (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 2020).
Cimbala & Lowther
ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 45
200 B-61 gravity bombs with a low operational readiness rate.
40
e question remains
whether the rst use of a nonstrategic or tactical nuclear weapon would automatically
expand into a much wider and more destructive conict or remain contained below
the threshold of general nuclear war. Such a scenario suggests a second question:
Once one adversary launches an attack using strategic nuclear weapons against selec-
tive military targets, sparing cities, is reciprocal counterforce restraint possible?
Answering either question requires some conjecture about American and Russian
approaches to escalation control and management.
41
With respect to lower- yield tactical
nuclear weapons, there are clear dierences between them and longer- range and more
destructive strategic nuclear forces. erefore, a “rebreak” between the two kinds of
weapons is imaginable, but in the exigent circumstances of confusion and alarm sur-
rounding nuclear war, mutual agreement on thresholds for limiting escalation may be
dicult to arrange. Even more challenging is the establishment of thresholds and re-
breaks with respect to strategic nuclear exchanges.
e rationale for limited strategic options is that they have two aspects: the imme-
diate destruction that they cause and the message that they send about the ability and
willingness to up the ante of destruction unless the other side agrees to terms. From
the American standpoint, the objective is to inuence the opponent through omas
Schelling’s “manipulation of risk” and the “threat that leaves something to chance.”
42
Whether this approach to messaging with (limited) mass destruction is under-
standable to Russian leaders, for example, is arguable, but probably circumstantial and
scenario dependent. Since the beginning of Russia’s war against Ukraine in 2022, Putin
has repeatedly made explicit references to the possibility of nuclear rst use in the case
of unacceptable losses by Russia.
43
What remains to be determined is when, or if, that
threshold of political or military unacceptability is reached. Yet nuclear weapons can
be employed without being detonated. ey are not only instruments of war but are
also useful for political intimidation and coercion. Russian military thinking recog-
nizes the potential utility of nuclear weapons in this regard. Russia’s nuclear threats
during its war against Ukraine are part of a larger matrix that one strategy expert has
termed cross- domain coercion:
e current Russian cross- domain coercion campaign is an integrated whole
of non- nuclear, informational, and nuclear types of deterrence and compel-
lence. Finally, the campaign contains a holistic informational (cyber) operation,
40. Mark B. Schneider, How Many Nuclear Weapons Does Russia Have? (Fairfax, VA: NIPP, 2023),
169–210; and “Nuclear Disarmament NATO,” NTI [Nuclear reat Initiative], February 6, 2023, https://
www.nti.org/.
41. See Olga Oliker, Russia’s Nuclear Doctrine: What We Know, What We Don’t, and What at Means
(Washington, DC: CSIS, 2016); and Arushi Singh, “Russia’s Nuclear Strategy: Change or Continuities,”
Journal of Advanced Military Studies 14, no. 2 (2023).
42. omas C. Schelling, Arms and Inuence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1967).
43. David Sanger and James McKinley, “Biden Warned of a Nuclear Armageddon: How Likely Is a
Nuclear Conict with Russia?,” New York Times, October 13, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/.
46 VOL. 2, NO. 4, WINTER 2023
Rethinking Russo- American Strategic Nuclear Arms Control
waged simultaneously on the digital- technological and on the cognitive-
psychological fronts, which skillfully merges military and non- military
capabilities across nuclear, conventional, and sub- conventional domains.
44
It follows that cross- domain coercion applies to political and military activities
prior to war, in the initial period of war, and during escalation management and/or
escalation dominance. With respect to strategic deterrence, this perspective was ar-
ticulated in Russia’s 2015 national security strategy, which states that interrelated “po-
litical, military, military- technical, diplomatic, economic, informational, and other
measures” are being developed and implemented “in order to ensure strategic deter-
rence and the prevention of armed conicts.”
45
If deterrence fails, Russia has not ruled out the possibility of a limited rst use of
nuclear weapons in order to deter expansion of the war by the opponent. ere is con-
siderable discussion in the United States of the prospect that Russia might “escalate to
de- escalate” a conventional war by means of nuclear rst use, but this prospect must
be put into a broader context:
But while nuclear use in a rst- strike mode to retrieve a losing conventional
war and force NATO to de- escalate may be part of the strategy (escalate to
de- escalate), that arguably is merely a part of a much broader nuclear strategy
that relies heavily on the psychological and intimidating or informational
components of nuclear weapons. In other words, we see a broader nuclear
strategy that aims to use these weapons to control the entire process of esca-
lation throughout the crisis from start to nish. If the crisis becomes kinetic,
escalating to de- escalate may well become an operative possibility.
46
Between Russia’s war on Ukraine and war more generally, the political objectives
for which states ght are related to their willingness to escalate or de- escalate the in-
tensity of ghting and the attendant costs therein. For Russia, its war on Ukraine may
be perceived as existential instead of merely opportunistic.
47
Putin has repeatedly
claimed that the war in Ukraine is about the survival of a uniquely Russian civilization
and culture that must either extend its inuence abroad or wither on the vine. From
this perspective, a Russia without de facto or de jure control over Ukraine is no longer
an empire, and a Russia that is not an empire is not the destined great power that its
history has mandated.
44. Dmitri Adamsky, Cross- Domain Coercion: e Current Russian Art of Strategy (Paris: Institut Fran-
cais des Relations Internationals, 2015), cited in Stephen Blank, “Nuclear Weapons in Russia’s War against
Ukraine,” Naval War College Review 75, no. 4 (Autumn 2022): 58.
45. Timothy L. omas, Russia: Military Strategy – Impacting 21st Century Reform and Geopolitics
(Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Oce, 2015), 112.
46. Blank, “Nuclear Weapons,” 61.
47. Yulia Talmazan, “From Buildup to Battle: Why Putin Stoked a Ukraine Crisis—en Launched an
Invasion,” NBC News, February 25, 2022, https://www.nbcnews.com/; and Isabel Van Brugen, “Putin’s
True Motive for Ukraine Invasion Revealed in Report,” Newsweek, April 26, 2023, https://www.newsweek
.com/.
Cimbala & Lowther
ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 47
Along with this, in 2022 the term Anglosaksy (Anglo- Saxons) appeared frequently
in Kremlin usage as a derogatory reference to duplicitous Americans and their Euro-
pean allies.
48
It predates the Putin regime, reverting to the latter 1940s and early 1950s
as a reference to the Soviet Union’s most important enemies who are assumed to be
plotting the destruction of the regime in Moscow.
49
If ambitious political objectives in Moscow are combined with a military- strategic
net assessment that a prolonged war of attrition in Ukraine favors Russia against its
opponents, the likelihood going forward is a tit- for- tat expansion of conventional war
ghting with a background of nuclear coercion du jour. Despite some assessments
that the Russian armed forces have underperformed in Ukraine relative to expecta-
tions, from a historical perspective Russian military thinking has evolved quite sub-
stantially.
50
In a controversial essay published in June 2023, one Russian academician ad-
dressed the issue of escalation in the war in Ukraine, arguing that Russian nuclear pre-
emption is a necessary means for reawakening NATO fears of nuclear deterrence in
order to prevent an otherwise inevitable escalation to global thermonuclear war:
We will have to make nuclear deterrence a convincing argument again by low-
ering the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons set unacceptably high, and
by rapidly but prudently moving up the deterrence- escalation ladder. . . . e
enemy must know that we are ready to deliver a preemptive strike in retaliation
for all of its current and past acts of aggression in order to prevent a slide into
global thermonuclear war.
51
Numerous rejoinders to this appeared promptly, including by Russian nuclear
policy experts.
52
Two aspects of this back- and- forth on nuclear preemption by Rus-
sians are especially interesting. First, the essay explicitly and implicitly draws upon
Western notions of escalation ladders and escalation control that were controversial
during the Cold War and were regarded by then Soviet political leaders and military
commentators as misguided military dilettantism. Second, it is possible the author is
engaged in disinformation prompted by Russian government sources that would prefer
this messaging to come from a purportedly objective academic source instead of the
Kremlin. If so, it corroborates the arguments, cited above, which argue nuclear weapons
48. Stefano Caprio, “Showdown with the ‘Anglosaksy,’ ” PIME Asia News, May 21, 2022, https://www
.asianews.it/.
49. Andrei Kolesnikov, “e Plot against Russia: How Putin Revived Stalinist Anti- Americanism to
Justify a Botched War,” Foreign Aairs, May 25, 2023, https://www.foreignaairs.com/.
50. See Randy Noorman, “e Russian Way of War in Ukraine: A Military Approach Nine Decades in
the Making,” Modern War Institute at West Point, June 15, 2023, https://mwi.usma.edu/.
51. Sergei A. Karaganov, “A Dicult but Necessary Decision,” Russia in Global Aairs, June 13, 2023,
https://eng.globalaairs.ru/.
52. See Dmitri Trenin, “e Ukrainian Conict and Nuclear Weapons,” Russia in Global Aairs, June
20, 2023, https://eng.globalaairs.ru/; and Ivan N. Timofeev, “A Preemptive Nuclear Strike? No!,” Russia in
Global Aairs, June 20, 2023, https://eng.globalaairs.ru/.
48 VOL. 2, NO. 4, WINTER 2023
Rethinking Russo- American Strategic Nuclear Arms Control
are among the instruments in Russia’s tool kit of cross- domain coercion and are best
used in that role—compared to the operational uncertainties involved in nuclear
rst use.
New START Viability
e previous section discussed some of the obstacles to successful Russo- American
strategic nuclear arms control in its future context. An immediate issue is whether
New START provides a platform for interim strategic stability in the near term and/or
a launching pad for more ambitious agreements in the longer term, should political
relations between Washington and Moscow improve.
To help answer these questions, this article examines the current and prospective
near- term strategic nuclear balance between the United States and Russia and projects
alternative force structures for each state. is examination takes place in two phases.
In the rst phase, the model develops alternative force structures for each state and
assigns appropriate numbers of weapons to each state’s deployed strategic launchers.
In each case, New START limitations on the numbers of accountable weapons and
launchers are observed.
It is assumed that the benchmark force structure for both the United States and for
Russia will deploy a mix of ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. Yet for the sake of
comparison and analysis, alternative forces for each state are also projected. For the
United States, in addition to the traditional triad of strategic nuclear forces, the fol-
lowing alternative force structures are included: a dyad of ballistic missile submarines
(SSBNs) and heavy bombers without ICBMs, a dyad of ICBMs and SLBMs without
bombers, and a force composed entirely of ballistic missile submarines and SLBMs.
For Russia, in addition to the traditional triad, the included alternative force struc-
tures are a dyad of ICBMs and SLBMs without heavy bombers, a dyad of ICBMs and
heavy bombers without SLBMs, and a force composed entirely of ICBMs.
In the second phase, the analytical model estimates the numbers of surviving and
retaliating warheads for each state’s forces under each of the following conditions of
alertness and launch protocols: (1) generated alert, launch on warning (maximum
retaliation); (2) generated alert, riding out the attack, and then retaliating (intermediate
retaliation); (3) day- to- day alert, launch on warning (intermediate retaliation); and
(4) day- to- day alert, riding out the attack, and retaliating (assured or minimum
retaliation).
53
e analysis makes no assumptions about the combinations of alert status
and launch protocols that may exist in any particular situation; that is obviously scenario
dependent. Nor is it assumed that American or Russian leaders will necessarily have
accurate information or perceptions about the status of forces on the other side.
e results of these simulations point to several preliminary conclusions. First,
New START- level numbers of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads and
53. Grateful acknowledgment is made to Dr. James Scouras for use of his Arriving Weapons Sensitivity
Model, as adapted for this project.
Cimbala & Lowther
ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 49
launchers should provide adequate numbers of second- strike surviving and retaliating
warheads under any conditions of alertness and launch protocols. Admittedly there
are variations across these retaliatory options that might be important to military
planners and policymakers, depending upon their assumptions about nuclear employ-
ment policy. e more ambitious the list of enemy targets assigned for prompt or de-
layed destruction by each side, the more demanding the requirements for surviving
and retaliating weapons. It may turn out that, for example, the number of weapons
available under the scenario of day- to- day alert and riding out the attack before retali-
ating are insucient to provide for exible targeting or for escalation control.
It is worth noting that the analysis presented here is premised on Russia maintaining
a strategic nuclear arsenal within the New START limits. Russia’s suspension of New
START, which equates to withdrawal from the treaty, may mean Russia has already
begun the process of uploading additional warheads on existing delivery vehicles or
elding new systems.
54
Russia certainly has the capacity to rapidly increase the size of
their arsenal.
More problematical is the survivability and endurance of the respective NC3 systems
for each state following a nuclear attack.
55
is system of systems has two parts: tech-
nology and people. e technology is expected to perform pre- attack and continue
performing, albeit in a degraded form, postattack. e people are expected to persevere
regardless of destruction already experienced by their country. ese are optimistic
assumptions.
Additionally, there are societal consequences of nuclear war. e detonation of
even tens of weapons on American, European, or Russian soil will create widespread
societal distress. What remains of the national command authority in the United
States or Russia may nd itself under siege for having committed the worst blunder
possible. Fortunately, there is a complete lack of experience with such an event, making
any predictions highly speculative.
e point is that various postattack scenarios are imaginable. Once deterrence fails,
it is conceivable, but not inevitable, that control over forces is maintained sucient to
limit escalation and move toward conict termination.
56
For that to happen, leaders in
the United States and Russia need secure and reliable postattack communications and
a shared desire to spare their societies further misery. Cooler heads must prevail over
desire for revenge. It can happen, but history is not reassuring. e nature of warfare,
according to Clausewitz, is to escalate and expand, not to de- escalate.
57
54. Adam Lowther and Derek Williams, “Why America Has a Launch on Attack Option,” War on the
Rocks, July 10, 2023, https://warontherocks.com/.
55. Bruce G. Blair, “Loose Cannons: e President and US Nuclear Posture,” Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists 76, no. 1 (2020), https://doi.org/.
56. See Matthew R. Costlow, Restraints at the Nuclear Brink: Factors in Keeping War Limited (Fairfax,
VA: NIPP, 2023).
57. See Stephen J. Cimbala, Clausewitz and Escalation: Classical Perspective on Nuclear Strategy (New
York: Routledge, 1989).
50 VOL. 2, NO. 4, WINTER 2023
Rethinking Russo- American Strategic Nuclear Arms Control
Conclusion
Russo-American nuclear arms control is on life support and fading fast. If reports
coming out of the November 2023 arms control meetings between Chinese and
American envoys is accurate, any arms control agreement that includes China is dead
on arrival.
58
Optimistically, New START redux provides a starting point for renewed
eorts to limit the growth of strategic nuclear arsenals and to provide for deterrence
and arms race stability between the United States and Russia. It does little, however,
for the problem of incorporating China into the arms control framework.
Future negotiations should use New START as a starting baseline but not necessarily
as a most preferred destination. A post-New START arms control regime will have to
navigate the challenges posed by an ongoing war in Ukraine; the need to bring China
into talks; the rising signicance of the space and cyber domains for warfare and de-
terrence; new and prospective technologies in oensive and defensive weapons; and
comparative concepts of escalation and de- escalation held by the United States, Rus-
sia, and China. ese are large challenges and a demanding context within which to
plan for American nuclear modernization and future deterrence stability. Æ
58. Jonathan Landay and Arshad Mohammed, “US Says China Reveals Little in Arms Control Talks,”
US News & World Report, November 7, 2023, https://www.usnews.com/.
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