S S Q ♦ F 2017 95
Nuclear Arms Control:
A Nuclear Posture Review Opportunity
Stephen J. Cimbala
Abstract
US nuclear posture includes national priorities for nuclear arms control.
One important issue for the Trump administration is the possibility of
extending or revising the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)
of 2010 that goes into eect in 2018 and expires in 2021. e analysis
that follows compares outcomes from New START and lower numbers
of deployed weapons for the United States and for Russia, in terms of
their implications for deterrence and arms control stability. e signi-
cance of missile defenses in this context is also addressed, since Russia
has dened US missile defenses as destabilizing with respect to nuclear
arms control and potentially nullifying of Russia’s nuclear deterrent.
✵ ✵ ✵ ✵ ✵
Vladimir Putin’s third term as Russian president conicted with the goals
of Barack Obama’s second term as US president. As a result, US-Russian
political relations were mired in negativity, precluding the possibility of any
follow-up agreement to the New START nuclear arms reduction treaty of
2010.
1
If relations between the two countries eventually improve, should
America and Russia extend New START or, with more ambition, seek
post–New START reductions in their numbers of operationally deployed
long-range nuclear weapons and launchers? is question must be considered
part of the current US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). e discussion that
follows addresses this issue in four steps: (1) where things stand now,
(2) options for strategic nuclear arms reductions, (3) the implications of
missile defenses for nuclear strategic stability, and (4) conclusions and
related discussion.
Stephen J. Cimbala is a distinguished professor of political science at Penn State–Brandywine and
author of numerous works on national security, nuclear arms control, deterrence, and missile defense.
His most recent book is Nuclear Weapons in a Multipolar World (New York: Routledge, 2016).
Stephen J. Cimbala
96 S S Q ♦ F 2017
Nuclear Stasis
More than two and one-half decades after the end of the Cold War
and the demise of the Soviet Union, post-Soviet Russia and the United
States maintain numerous nuclear weapons deployed on intercontinental
and transoceanic launchers, including land-based intercontinental bal-
listic missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM),
and heavy bombers capable of carrying a variety of munitions, includ-
ing gravity bombs, air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM), and advanced
cruise missiles. Even after complying with the reductions called for in
the New START agreement signed by presidents Obama and Medvedev
in 2010, Russia and the United States will deploy a maximum number of
1,550 long-range or “strategic” nuclear weapons on a maximum of 700
deployed intercontinental launchers.
2
In addition, a signicant number
of each state’s strategic nuclear weapons will require prompt launch for
survivability, increasing the risk of nuclear instability in time of crisis.
It would be an understatement to say that the current nuclear relation-
ship between the United States and the Russian Federation is an historical
and strategic anomaly. eir nuclear arsenals remain sized in relation
to each other and directly pointed at one another despite the fact that,
were nuclear crisis management and deterrence to fail, no acceptable
outcome to any nuclear war between the United States or NATO and
Russia is foreseeable.
3
To be sure, former President Obama’s national
security strategy and nuclear policy documents indicated that, so long
as nuclear weapons existed anywhere, the United States would maintain
a nuclear force and supporting infrastructure second to none. And he
was right: with nuclear weapons, blung is a dangerous game. States
that want to play this game need to know, and their enemies must know,
that their nuclear deterrent is safe, secure, reliable, and proof against
either of two kinds of error. First, the US nuclear deterrent should be
promptly responsive to duly authorized commands for nuclear retalia-
tion after having been attacked—but the United States must not launch
a nuclear retaliatory attack on a mistaken premise that an enemy has
already launched a nuclear rst strike. Second, US nuclear weapons also
provide “extended deterrence” for American allies and, in so doing, sup-
port global nonproliferation by limiting those states’ vulnerability to
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S S Q ♦ F 2017 97
nuclear coercion and/or attack, and thus reducing their incentives to
become nuclear-weapons states.
How many weapons are needed to satisfy these criteria is an arguable
question. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States and Russia
have downsized their nuclear arsenals considerably. e New START
limitations (1,550 deployed weapons on 700 deployed intercontinental
launchers) for each state are a long way from the tens of thousands of
deployed weapons that marked the height of the Cold War. Politically
the United States and Russia have convergent and divergent interests.
On the one hand, Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and continuing
destabilization of eastern Ukraine have provoked NATO responses that
include larger US and allied force deployments in Eastern Europe, includ-
ing in states bordering Russia, as well as having boosted American and
allied expenditures for conventional defense in Europe.
4
On the other
hand, Russia and the United States have at least partly overlapping and
congruent interests in defeating terrorism, in a stable post-NATO
Afghanistan, and in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to rogue
states or nonstate actors, including terrorists. In Europe, NATO seeks
to maintain a spectrum of deterrent and defense capabilities to forestall
aggression, to prevail in a conventional war if necessary, and to deter
nuclear rst use. NATO also faces the challenge of Russian hybrid war-
fare, including nonkinetic components such as cyberwar, active mea-
sures, disinformation, and varieties of inuence operations. Although
it is hoped that neither hybrid nor conventional warfare would escalate
beyond the nuclear threshold, US strategic nuclear forces and other
nuclear weapons deployed on the territories of NATO allies support
NATO’s mission as being capable of deterring and resisting aggression
at all levels. NATO requires this exibility because, as military planners
well know and history teaches, states often get the wars that they did not
plan for or expect.
Granted, Russia maintains its strategic and shorter range nuclear forces
for political and military reasons other than those having to do with its
relations with the United States and NATO. Russia enjoys the cachet and
spillover diplomatic suasion of being a nuclear superpower treated as an
equal by the United States in nuclear arms control. Tables 1 and 2 sum-
marize Russian and American strategic nuclear forces in 2016.
Stephen J. Cimbala
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Table 1. Russia strategic nuclear forces, 2016
Type Launchers
Warheads
per launcher
Total
warheads
ICBM
a
SS-18 46 10 460
SS-19 20 6 120
SS-25 90 1 90
SS-27 Mod. 1
(mobile)
18 1 18
SS-27 Mod. 1
(silo)
60 1 60
SS-27 Mod. 2
(mobile)
(Russian RS-24)
63 4 252
SS-27 Mod. 2
(silo)
(Russian RS-24)
10 4 40
RS-26 Yars-M 0 0 0
SS-27 Mod.
(rail mobile)
0 0 0
SS-XX “heavy”
(silo)
(RS-28 Sarmat)
0 0 0
Subtotal ICBM 307 27 1,040
SLBM
b
SS-N-18 2/32 3 96
SS-N-23 6/96 4 384
SS-N-32 3/48 6 288
Subtotal SLBM 11/176 13 768
Bombers/weapons
Bear-H6 27 6
c
162
Bear-H16 30 16
c
480
Blackjack 13 12
d
156
Subtotal
bombers/weapons
70 34 798
Total 553 74 ~2,600
e
Source: Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2016,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 72, no. 3 (2016):
125–34, http://doi.org/f8n4ft. See also Arms Control Association, “Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces under New START,” October
2016, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Russian-Strategic-Nuclear-Forces-Under-New-START.
Note: e following key applies also to tables 2–8.
a
Intercontinental ballistic missile
b
Submarine-launched ballistic missile
c
Air-launched cruise missile (ALCM), bombs
d
ALCMs, short-range attack missiles (SRAM), bombs
e
About 1,800 warheads are actually deployed on missiles and at bomber bases. Bombers carry three kinds of weapons: ALCMs,
gravity bombs, and SRAMs air-to-ground. Also, under New START counting rules, each bomber counts as a single warhead.
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Table 2. US strategic nuclear forces, 2016
Type Launchers
Warheads
per launcher
Total
warheads
ICBM
Minuteman III 440 1 440
SLBM
Trident II D5 288 4 1,152
Bombers/weapons
B-52H 44
a
–—
b
200
B-2A 16
a
–—
b
100
Subtotal
bombers/weapons
60 300
Total 788 ~5 1,892
Source: Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “United States Nuclear Forces, 2016,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 72, no. 2
(2016): 63–73, http://doi.org/b8zj. See also Arms Control Association, “U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces under New START,” October
2016, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/USStratNukeForceNewSTART.
a
Counts only primary mission aircraft tasked for nuclear missions
b
US bombers can deliver variable mixes of air-launched cruise missiles and gravity bombs, depending on mission.
In military terms, Russia’s conventional (nonnuclear) forces are vastly
inferior to those of the former Soviet Union and to those currently de-
ployed by the United States and NATO. Although members of the
alliance assume a NATO military attack on Russia is inconceivable, Rus-
sians fear that an imbalance in usable military power between NATO
and Russia reduces Russia’s military shadow over contestable parts of the
former Soviet space that Moscow regards as a zone of privileged interest.
5
In addition, although Russian ocials rarely speak of it in public, Russia
cannot help but notice the increasingly competent and “wired” military
of the People’s Republic of China and its higher prole in support of
China’s expanded denition of its interests in Asia and elsewhere.
6
But Russia would be mistaken to assume that nuclear weapons can,
in the long run, compensate for deciencies in its conventional armies,
navies, and air arms of service. Leading Russian military thinkers have
acknowledged the need for comprehensive military reform in everything
from manpower policy to weapons modernization.
7
Russia’s own docu-
mented interests in military cyberwar, together with its abysmal perfor-
mance in the war against Georgia in 2008, are only two indicators of its
recognition that nuclear weapons cannot resolve most of the outstand-
ing security issues in Russia’s favor.
8
Sooner or later, nuclear cover for
conventional military weakness falls at because nuclear weapons are
uniquely blunt weapons of mass destruction, not weapons for prevailing
Stephen J. Cimbala
100 S S Q ♦ F 2017
in combat at an acceptable cost. erefore, Russia’s putative case, that
tactical nuclear weapons can be used for “de-escalation” of a conict to
Russia’s advantage that would otherwise pose an unacceptable loss of
territory or sovereignty, is an example of military doublethink.
9
is
implies, or logically leads to, the following conclusion: Russian nuclear
weapons, like those in America, will continue to be seen as a last-ditch
option in peacetime and crisis by decision-makers with the practical
eect that, unlike in the Cold War, their main utility is deterring each
other rather than truly being tied tightly and seamlessly to a chain of
promised escalation like that seen in US and Russian postures in the
Cold War.
Options for Reductions
What do the preceding arguments suggest about the actual numbers
of strategic nuclear weapons the United States and Russia might require
for credible deterrence within the 2018–2021 time frame?
10
Tables 3
through 7 illustrate some benchmarks by which one could measure the
deterrence stability and military viability of US and Russian long-range
nuclear forces. e tables summarize the outcomes of nuclear force ex-
changes for the United States and Russia under four assumptions about
operational deployments.
11
Tables 3 and 4 assume future Russian and
American forces with maximum deployment limits as agreed under New
START (1,550 weapons counted under New START rules). For com-
parison, tables 5 and 6 assume post–New START reductions to a lower
maximum limit of 1,000 deployed weapons. In tables 7 and 8, each state
is limited to a hypothetical force structure with a maximum limit of 500
operationally deployed weapons on transcontinental launchers.
12
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S S Q ♦ F 2017 101
Table 3. US nuclear exchange outcomes (1,550 deployment limit)
Type US New START 1,550 Balanced triad
GEN
a
—LOW
b
Total Available Alert Surviving Arriving
ICBM
420 420 420 420 378
SLBM
1,064 958 958 958 862
Bombers
48 43 43 43 35
All 1,532 1,421 1,421 1,421 1,275
GEN—ROA
c
Total Available Alert Surviving Arriving
ICBM
420 420 420 42 38
SLBM
1,064 958 958 958 862
Bombers
48 43 43 14 11
All 1,532 1,421 1,421 1,014 911
DAY
d
—LOW
Total Available Alert Surviving Arriving
ICBM
420 420 420 420 378
SLBM
1,064 958 642 642 577
Bombers
48 43 0 0 0
All 1,532 1,421 1,062 1,062 955
DAY—ROA
Total Available Alert Surviving Arriving
ICBM
420 420 420 42 38
SLBM
1,064 958 642 642 577
Bombers
48 43 0 0 0
All 1,532 1,421 1,062 684 615
Note: e following key applies to tables 3–8.
a
Generated alert of full nuclear force (available)
b
Launch on warning
c
Ride out attack
d
Day-to-day forces on nuclear alert
Table 4. Russia nuclear exchange outcomes (1,550 deployment limit)
Type
Russia
New START 1,550 Balanced triad
GEN—LOW
Total Available Alert Surviving Arriving
ICBM
542 542 542 542 488
SLBM
640 576 576 576 518
Bombers
76 68 68 68 55
All 1,258 1,186 1,186 1,186 1,062
GEN—ROA
Total Available Alert Surviving Arriving
ICBM 542 542 542 79 71
SLBM 640 576 576 576 518
Bombers 76 68 68 22 18
All 1,258 1,186 1,186 677 607
Stephen J. Cimbala
102 S S Q ♦ F 2017
Table 4. Russia nuclear exchange outcomes (1,550 deployment limit)
(continued)
Type
Russia
New START 1,550 Balanced triad
DAY—LOW
Total Available Alert Surviving Arriving
ICBM 542 542 542 542 488
SLBM 640 576 115 115 104
Bombers 76 68 0 0 0
All 1,258 1,186 657 657
591
DAY—ROA
Total Available Alert Surviving Arriving
ICBM 542 542 542 54 49
SLBM 640 576 115 58 52
Bombers 76 68 0 0 0
All 1,258 1,186 657 112 101
Table 5. US nuclear exchange outcomes (1,000 deployment limit)
Type US New START 1,000 Balanced triad
GEN—LOW
Total Available Alert Surviving Arriving
ICBM 300 300 300 300 270
SLBM 648 583 583 583 525
Bombers 48 43 43 43 35
All 996 926 926 926 830
GEN—ROA
Total Available Alert Surviving Arriving
ICBM 300 300 300 30 27
SLBM 648 583 583 583 525
Bombers 48 43 43 14 11
All 996 926 926 627 563
DAY—LOW
Total Available Alert Surviving Arriving
ICBM 300 300 300 300 270
SLBM 648 583 391 391 352
Bombers 48 43 0 0 0
All 996 926 691 691 622
DAY—ROA
Total Available Alert Surviving Arriving
ICBM 300 300 300 30 27
SLBM 648 583 391 391 352
Bombers 48 43 0 0 0
All 996 926 691 421 379
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Table 6. Russia nuclear exchange outcomes (1,000 deployment limit)
Type
Russia
New START 1,000 Balanced triad
GEN—LOW
Total Available Alert Surviving Arriving
ICBM 342 342 342 342 308
SLBM 576 518 518 518 467
Bombers 76 68 68 68 55
All 994 928 928 928 830
GEN—ROA
Total Available Alert Surviving Arriving
ICBM 342 342 342 59 53
SLBM 576 518 518 518 467
Bombers 76 68 68 22 18
All 994 928 928 599 538
DAY—LOW
Total Available Alert Surviving Arriving
ICBM 342 342 342 342 308
SLBM 576 518 104 104 93
Bombers 76 68 0 0 0
All 994 928 446 446 401
DAY—ROA
Total Available Alert Surviving Arriving
ICBM 342 342 342 34 31
SLBM 576 518 104 52 47
Bombers 76 68 0 0 0
All 994 928 446 86 78
Table 7. US nuclear exchange outcomes (500 deployment limit)
Type US New START 500 Balanced triad
GEN—LOW
Total Available Alert Surviving Arriving
ICBM 115 115 115 115 104
SLBM 336 302 302 302 272
Bombers 48 43 43 43 35
All 499 460 460 460 4 11
GEN—ROA
Total Available Alert Surviving Arriving
ICBM 115 115 115 12 10
SLBM 336 302 302 302 272
Bombers 48 43 43 14 11
All 499 460 460 328 293
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Table 7. US nuclear exchange outcomes (500 deployment limit) (continued)
Type US New START 500 Balanced triad
DAY—LOW Total Available Alert Surviving Arriving
ICBM 115 115 115 115 104
SLBM 336 302 203 203 182
Bombers 48 43 0 0 0
All 499 460 318 318 286
DAY—ROA Total Available Alert Surviving Arriving
ICBM 115 115 115 12 10
SLBM 336 302 203 203 182
Bombers 48 43 0 0 0
All 499 460 318 215 192
Table 8. Russia nuclear exchange outcomes (500 deployment limit)
Type Russia New START 500 Balanced triad
GEN—LOW Total Available Alert Surviving Arriving
ICBM 257 257 257 257 231
SLBM 192 173 173 173 156
Bombers 51 46 46 46 37
All 500 476 476 476 424
GEN—ROA Total Available Alert Surviving Arriving
ICBM 257 257 257 50 45
SLBM 192 173 173 173 156
Bombers 51 46 46 15 12
All 500 476 476 238 213
DAY—LOW Total Available Alert Surviving Arriving
ICBM 257 257 257 257 231
SLBM 192 173 35 35 31
Bombers 51 46 0 0 0
All 500 476 292 292 262
DAY—ROA Total Available Alert Surviving Arriving
ICBM 257 257 257 26 23
SLBM 192 173 35 17 16
Bombers 51 46 0 0 0
All 500 476 292 43 39
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e preceding tables show that each state has numbers of surviving
and retaliating weapons sucient to satisfy the criterion of “unacceptable
damage” in a second strike so long as unacceptable damage is dened by
reference to the destruction of populations and societal values alone. If
we use McGeorge Bundy’s formula of 10 weapons on 10 cities as a
“disaster beyond history,” then even 500 deployed weapons provide
several hundred retaliatory warheads for either side under plausible
conditions of nuclear attack and response.
13
However, this “city busting”
criterion does not address the more nuanced requirements imposed
on US (and doubtless Russian) military planners. Essentially, policy
makers and planners have three paths or opportunities here: (1) drop the
numbers of deployed weapons and launchers to a “minimum deterrent”
standard, (2) agree to more limited nuclear reductions in a post–New
START regime (New START light), and/or (3) “multilateralize” the
arms-reduction talks to include China (essential if minimum deterrence
is the goal but still useful if larger than minimum deterrent forces are
being considered as the endgame).
What actually gets decided in Washington or in Moscow depends
as much on politics as it does on strategy. On one hand, it will be dif-
cult to sell domestic political forces in the United States (for example,
Republican members of Congress) or in Russia (the Russian military-
industrial complex) on post–New START reductions as drastic as a
maximum deployment limit of 500 weapons. In addition, such a truly
minimum deterrent option for the United States and Russia would
require that the post–New START negotiations be expanded to include
other nuclear weapons states. On the other hand, reductions to a maxi-
mum number of 1,000 operationally deployed weapons for each state
should be politically feasible. Russia’s nuclear force modernization plans
are ambitious but not necessarily aordable or otherwise feasible. e
current status of Russia’s military-industrial complex is less than enviable.
Russia’s nuclear warning and C3 system (command, control, and com-
munications) system has serious deciencies in satellite coverage and
other weaknesses.
14
It might turn out that Russia’s New START–compliant
force will level o at some number below 1,550 deployed warheads and
that Russia would be quite agreeable to the 1,000 benchmark for further
reductions. At the same time, if a post–New START regime follows
New START counting rules, each bomber would count as one weapon,
and the actual number of weapons deployed by each state would exceed
Stephen J. Cimbala
106 S S Q ♦ F 2017
the notional deployment ceiling (1,000) by several hundred warheads.
A US-Russian post–New START agreement for a maximum of 1,000
operationally deployed long-range weapons maintains their shared
“nuclear superpower” status relative to other nuclear weapons states and
should be considered one possibility for the nuclear posture review. is
status, however, confers responsibilities on Moscow and Washington for
taking the lead in reducing nuclear danger, including measures to pre-
vent the further spread of nuclear weapons and to roll back existing cases
of system-disturbing nuclear proliferation in states such as North Korea.
Missile Defenses: Prophecy or Problem?
Missile defenses, if successful, oer the possibility that deterrence
by threat of unacceptable retaliation could be supported by deterrence
based on denial of the attacker’s objectives.
15
Today missile defenses
remain technologically and politically contentious. Russian objections
to the US- and NATO-proposed European Phased Adaptive Approach
(EPAA) to missile defenses remained emphatic even as US Department
of Defense studies cast doubt on the technical prociency of the pro-
posed components for the European BMD (ballistic missile defense)
systems.
16
A study by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) on mis-
sile defense technologies called into question some of the thinking of
the Obama administration and the Missile Defense Agency about the
priority of certain missions and technologies for BMD.
17
But other expert
scientists criticized the NAS study as containing “numerous awed as-
sumptions, analytical oversights, and internal inconsistencies” leading
to “fundamental errors in many of the report’s most important ndings
and recommendations” and as undermining its scientic credibility.
18
Future technology challenges to the development and deployment of
missile defenses will have more to do with the complexity of software
engineering for multiple contingencies and players, compared to the
bipolar and physics-centric context of the Cold War.
19
Suce it to say
that the academic and policy arguments continue as to the feasibility
and desirability of building missile defenses, alongside the inertial pull
of research and development funding in this direction since the Reagan
administration’s Strategic Defense Initiative.
20
But this issue remains
important to the nuclear posture review.
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S S Q ♦ F 2017 107
If the linkage between US and NATO plans for European missile
defenses and further progress in US-Russian strategic nuclear arms
reductions was not yet a hostage relationship, it was clearly a problem-
atical connection.
21
e New START agreement does not preclude the
United States from deploying future missile defenses, despite Russian
eorts during the negotiating process to restrict American degrees of
freedom in this regard.
22
Former Russian president Dmitri Medvedev and
his predecessor-successor Vladimir Putin made it clear that Russia’s geo-
strategic perspective links US and NATO missile defenses to cooperation
on other arms control issues. Meanwhile, in 2011 the United States and
NATO moved forward with the rst phase of a four-phase deployment
of the EPAA for missile defenses.
23
In March 2013, secretary of defense
Chuck Hagel announced plans to modify the original plan for EPAA by
abandoning the originally planned deployments of SM-3 IIB interceptor
missiles in Poland by 2022. But this step failed to reassure Russian skeptics
about the claims that US and NATO regional and global missile defenses
were not oriented against Russia. Russian ocials frequently reiterate de-
mands for a legally binding guarantee from the United States and NATO
that Russian strategic nuclear forces would not be targeted or aected by
the system.
24
Table 9 summarizes the status of the EPAA BMD as of
autumn 2013.
Although the prospects for US-Russian or NATO-Russian agreement
on European missile defenses might seem challenging at this writing,
the prospects for American cooperation with allies and partners outside
of Europe on regional missile defenses are more favorable. e potential
bull market for missile defenses lies in Asia, including prompts from
Sino-Japanese rivalry, North Korean threats and missile tests, and de-
terrence challenges between India and Pakistan. Missile defenses might
appeal to states in Asia as support for deterrence by denial of enemy at-
tack and as a means of damage limitation, should deterrence fail. Missile
defenses for some US allies and partners might also reinforce security
guarantees based on the American nuclear umbrella and consequently
reduce the incentives for those states to develop their own nuclear arse-
nals.
25
Each of these BMD aspects have direct bearing on and relevance
to the US nuclear posture review.
Stephen J. Cimbala
108 S S Q ♦ F 2017
Table 9. European phased adaptive approach to missile defense
Facet Phase I Phase II Phase III
Phase IV
(canceled March
2013)
Time frame 2 011 2015 2018 2020
Capability Deploying
today’s
capability
Enhancing
medium-range
missile defense
Enhancing
intermediate-range
missile defense
Early intercept of
MRBM
a
, IRBM
b
,
and ICBM
c
Threat/mission Address
regional bal-
listic missile
threats to
Europe and
deployed US
personnel
Expand de-
fended area
against short-and
medium-range
missile threats to
Southern Europe
Counter short-,
medium-, and
intermediate-range
missile threats to
include all of Europe
Cope with MRBMs,
IRBMs, and
potential future
ICBM threats to the
United States
Components AN/TPY-2
(FBM)
d
in
Kurecik,
Turkey;
C2BMC
e
in
Ramstein,
Germany;
Aegis BMD
f
ships with
SM
g
-3 IA off
the coast of
Spain
AN/TPY-2 (FBM)
in Kurecik,
Turkey; C2BMC
in Ramstein,
Germany; Aegis
BMD ships with
SM-3 IB off the
coast of Spain;
Aegis Ashore
h
with SM-3 1B in
Romania
AN/TPY-2 (FBM) in
Kurecik, Turkey;
C2BMC in Ramstein,
Germany; Aegis BMD
ships with SM-3 IIA
off the
coast of Spain;
Aegis
Ashore
with SM-3 IB/IIA in
Romania and Poland
AN/TPY-2 (FBM) in
Kurecik, Turkey;
C2BMC in
Ramstein, Ger-
many; Aegis BMD
ships with SM-3 IIA
off the
coast of Spain;
Aegis
Ashore
with SM-3 IIB
in Romania and
Poland
Technology Exists In testing Under development In conceptual stage
when canceled
Locations Turkey,
Germany,
ships off
the coast of
Spain
Turkey,
Germany, ships
off the coast of
Spain, ashore in
Romania
Turkey, Germany,
ships off the coast
of Spain, ashore in
Romania and Poland
Turkey, Germany,
ships off the coast
of Spain, ashore
in Romania and
Poland
Note: Separate national contributions to the mission of European BMD have been announced by Netherlands and France.
Source: Karen Kaya, “NATO Missile Defense and the View from the Front Line,” Joint Force Quarterly 71 (4th Quarter 2013): 86,
http://ndupress.ndu.edu/JFQ/Joint-Force-Quarterly-71/.
a
Medium-range ballistic missile
b
Intermediate-range ballistic missile
c
Intercontinental ballistic missile
d
AN/TPY-2 (FBM)—Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance, Model 2 (Forward-based Mode)
e
Command, control, battle management, and communications
f
Ballistic missile defense
g
Standard missile
h
Land-based component of the Aegis BMD system
Beyond the Nuclear Posture Review per se, the question of missile
defenses raises important issues having to do with the relationship be-
tween the politics and the technology of deterrence. Missile defenses
that are “too good” potentially undermine stable deterrence based on
assured retaliation that inicts unacceptable damage. But a mixture of
defenses of uncertain performance with oenses threatens to create an
open-ended arms race and additional uncertainties that, during a crisis,
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S S Q ♦ F 2017 109
might contribute to rst-strike fears. Added to this, new technologies
for improved accuracy in long-range strike weapons and better remote
sensing could pose greater threats to platform survivability based on
hardening or concealment. And, once having been deployed, defenses
would themselves become attractive targets for defense-suppression at-
tacks, creating incentives for pre-preemptive strikes against defenses
while preemption against enemy oensive forces remained on the table.
To be clear, the next NPR will have to address how oenses and defenses
work together to (1) support deterrence and defense policy objectives
and (2) remember the lessons learned from years of Cold War and later
experience about the unique character of nuclear weapons and nuclear
danger, albeit in a changing world.
Conclusions and Recommendations
e United States and Russia have opportunities for nuclear arms
reductions if other issues of military-strategic disagreement, including
Russia’s possible violation of the INF Treaty, can be managed success-
fully. However, arms control is primarily a political process, not a tech-
nical one. e two states must agree that their leadership on global non-
proliferation and nuclear risk reduction is a matter of priority on account
of their large arsenals, their high visibility in nuclear world politics, and
their experience in nuclear consultation and negotiation. Analysis shows
that US-Russian strategic nuclear stability is possible at various levels of
deployed warheads and launchers. e Trump administration’s nuclear
posture review might be just the occasion for new ideas, including new
departures in nuclear arms control. Several possibilities and recommen-
dations emerge.
1. e United States and Russia should agree now to extend the
duration of the New START treaty and, in addition, enter into
discussions about post–New START reductions consistent with
strategic stability.
2. Military-to-military exchanges between US and Russian special-
ists, suspended during the Obama administration, should be re-
sumed in the interest of transparency and security.
3. US-Russian arms-reduction talks should deal not only with simple
counts and verication but also with the larger contexts of strategy
Stephen J. Cimbala
110 S S Q ♦ F 2017
and security as perceived by both states; for example, what are the
consequences of possible improvements in missile defenses and in
conventional long-range precision strike weapons, for nuclear de-
terrence based on assured retaliation?
4. Since the likelihood of a tactical nuclear rst use is higher than
the probability of a separate decision for a strategic nuclear rst
strike, more transparency about NATO and Russian tactical nu-
clear weapons deployed in Europe and in Asia is essential. An out-
break of accidental or inadvertent nuclear war growing of out of an
escalation from conventional war is as likely, or more likely, than
a mistaken strategic nuclear response per se. At the same time,
smaller weapons are, for deterrence purposes, ambiguously con-
nected to the possible employment of larger and more destructive
forces. Tactical nuclear weapons are linked to strategic weapons
because of the complex dual nature of the former: they are possible
rebreaks between lesser and greater degrees of war. e process of
negotiating increased transparency with respect to the numbers,
locations, and capabilities of tactical nukes should begin now.
26
But the road to tactical nuclear arms reductions as between NATO
and Russia is a much more dicult problem than further reduc-
tions in US and Russian strategic nuclear weapons, and for that
reason it requires a separate study in its own right.
5. US-Russian cooperation on theater missile defenses in Europe
should be encouraged, including the development of joint cent-
ers of observation and monitoring against threats from the Mid-
dle East or other outside-of-Europe locations. Current generations
of strategic antimissile defenses are promissory notes, not proven
technologies under conditions of wartime stress.
27
Russian o-
cials continue to assert nevertheless that current and prospective
US missile defense plans threaten the viability of Russia’s nuclear
deterrent and, therefore, international stability.
28
Doubtless future
antimissile technologies will improve relative to ballistic oensive
weapons, given the ages of the latter.
29
However, the ultimate out-
come of competition between defensive antimissiles and oensive
countermeasures remains at the mercy of creative science and en-
gineering as well as politics and state priorities.
30
US- and NATO-
proposed missile defenses for Europe are admittedly a matter of
Nuclear Arms Control
S S Q ♦ F 2017 111
contemporary controversy.
31
But they should not be an excuse for
Russia, the United States, or NATO to defer progress on strategic
and nonstrategic nuclear reductions in oensive weapons.
Many of these recommendations might be grouped under the head-
ing of creating new, or revived, knowledge communities among arms-
control specialists and others in the national security and military studies
worlds. ese communities would cut across professional and national
boundaries to bring together interested specialists and policy makers for
discussions about their perspectives on nuclear deterrence, crisis man-
agement, nonproliferation, nuclear security, and other issues. Some-
thing like this occurred between the United States and the Soviet Union
during the Cold War. Over time, shared expectations and understand-
ings about the bases of nuclear deterrence, the “deliverables” possible in
arms control, and the challenges of nuclear crisis management helped to
control the arms race and bring a peaceful end to the Cold War. In the
twenty-rst century, academics and practitioners will have to shepherd
understandings about the relationship between oenses and defenses,
the implications of cyberwar for nuclear deterrence, and the impact of
third oset technologies (articial intelligence, nanotechnology, and
3-D manufacturing, among others) on nuclear arms control and deter-
rence strategy. In addition, the conversation on strategic nuclear arms
control must move from a two-sided American and Russian experience
toward a tripartite nuclear summitry that includes China, despite indi-
vidual, dierent policy objectives, experiences, and strategic perspectives
with respect to nuclear weapons.
With regard to arms control more generally, Paul Bracken emphasizes
that the challenges of the second nuclear age may be very dierent from
the rst: “Arms control is in desperate need of fresh ideas. It’s like Sanka,
an old, tired brand that is still around but in need of a makeover. I want
to put the challenge to arms control in just this way. Without new en-
ergy and a new edginess, arms control’s downward spiral into irrelevance
will continue. Arms control is too important to allow this to happen.”
32
e nuclear posture review presents an opportunity for fresh ideas
and new energy to prevent the collapse and relevance of arms control.
e Trump administration and the Department of Defense should seize
this opportunity before it fades away.
Stephen J. Cimbala
112 S S Q ♦ F 2017
Notes
1. For example, see Peter Baker, Neil MacFarquhar, and Michael R. Gordon, “Syria Strike
Puts U.S. Relationship with Russia at Risk,” New York Times, 7 April 2017, https://www
.nytimes.com/2017/04/07/world/middleeast/missile-strike-syria-russia.html.
2. Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures
for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Oensive Arms (Washington, DC: De-
partment of State, 8 April 2010), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/140035.pdf.
3. Aaron Mehta, “Former SecDef Perry: US on ‘Brink’ of New Nuclear Arms Race,” De-
fense News, 3 December 2015, http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/policy-budget
/2015/12/03/former-secdef-perry-us-brink-new-nuclear-arms-race/76721640/.
4. Philip M. Breedlove, “NATO’s Next Act: How to Handle Russia and Other reats,”
Foreign Aairs, July/August 2016, https://www.foreignaairs.com/articles/europe/2016-06-13
/natos-next-act. On current and prospective Russian strategic military thinking, see Stephen
R. Covington, e Culture of Strategic ought behind Russia’s Modern Approaches to Warfare
(Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School, October 2016).
5. BBC, “Russia Security Paper Designates NATO as reat,” 31 December 2015, http://
www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35208636.
6. See, for example, Mark B. Schneider, Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and
Security Review Commission, Hearing on “Developments in China’s Cyber and Nuclear Ca-
pabilities,” 26 March 2012, http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/les/3.26.12schneider.pdf; and
Oce of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress, Military and Security Develop-
ments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2014 (Washington, DC: Oce of the Secretary
of Defense, 2014), https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2014_DoD_China
_Report.pdf.
7. For example, see Ariel Cohen and Robert E. Hamilton, e Russian Military and the
Georgian War: Lessons and Implications (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army
War College, June 2011); and Rod ornton, Military Modernization and the Russian Ground
Forces (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, June 2011).
8. Timothy L. omas, Russia: Military Strategy: Impacting 21st Century Reform and Geo-
politics (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Oce, 2015), 253–99. omas dis-
cusses Russian concepts of information warfare and related policy and planning decisions.
9. For an expert appraisal of Russian military thinking about tactical nuclear weapons,
see Jacob W. Kipp, “Russian Doctrine on Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Contexts, Prisms, and
Connections,” in Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO, ed. Tom Nichols, Douglas Stuart,
and Jerey D. McCausland (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, April 2012), 116–54.
See also Olga Oliker, “No, Russia Isn’t Trying to Make Nuclear War Easier,” National Interest,
23 May 2016, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/no-russia-isnt-trying-make-nuclear-war
-easier-16310.
10. Regardless the outcome of the analysis, the exercise is necessary in order to impose
analytical boundaries on the discussion. See Keith B. Payne, “Why US Nuclear Force Numbers
Matter,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 10, no. 2 (Summer 2016): 14–24, http://www.au.af.mil
/au/ssq/digital/pdf/Summer16/Payne.pdf.
11. Grateful acknowledgment is made to James Scouras for use of his Arriving Weapons
Sensitivity Model in this study. Dr. Scouras is not responsible for its use here or for any argu-
ments in this paper.
12. Force structures in the analysis are notional and not necessarily predictive of actual
deployments. For expert appraisal, see, in addition to previous citations, Hans M. Kristensen,
“Trimming Nuclear Excess: Options for Further Reductions of U.S. and Russian Nuclear
Forces,” Special Report no. 5 (Washington, DC: Federation of American Scientists, December
Nuclear Arms Control
S S Q ♦ F 2017 113
2012), https://fas.org/pub-reports/trimming-nuclear-excess/; Gen James Cartwright, retired,
chair, Global Zero Nuclear Policy Commission, Report: Modernizing U.S. Nuclear Strategy,
Force Structure and Posture (Washington, DC: Global Zero, May 2012), https://www.globalzero
.org/les/gz_us_nuclear_policy_commission_report.pdf; and Pavel Podvig, “New START
Treaty in Numbers,” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces (blog), 9 April 2010, http://russianforces
.org/blog/2010/03/new_start_treaty_in_numbers.shtml. See also Joseph Cirincione, “Strategic
Turn: New U.S. and Russian Views on Nuclear Weapons,” New America Foundation, 29 June
2011, http://newamerica.net/publications/policy/strategic_turn; and Arms Control Associa-
tion, “U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces under New START,” http://www.armscontrol.org/fact
sheets/USStratNukeForceNewSTART.
13. McGeorge Bundy, “To Cap the Volcano,” Foreign Aairs 48, no. 1 (October 1969):
10, http://doi.org/d6mc7p.
14. Russia’s strategic nuclear forces and their progression may be followed on Pavel Podvig’s
expert blog, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces. See, for example, “New START Treaty in Numbers,”
n. 12.
15. According to Adam B. Lowther, deterrence can be conceptualized as a continuous
spectrum with three components: deterrence by dissuasion, deterrence by denial, and deter-
rence by threat. Moving across the spectrum from dissuasion through denial to threat in-
creases the level of action by the state attempting to deter. See Lowther, “How Can the United
States Deter Nonstate Actors?” in Deterrence: Rising Powers, Rogue Regimes, and Terrorism in
the Twenty-rst Century, ed. Adam Lowther (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2012), 163–82,
esp. 166–67.
16. Desmond Butler, Associated Press, “Flaws Found in U.S. Missile Shield for Europe,”
Army Times, 9 February 2013, http://www.armytimes.com/mobile/news/2013/02/ap-aws
-missile-shield-020913. See also “U.S. Missile Defense Shield Flawed: Classied Studies,” Russia
Today, 9 February 2013, https://www.rt.com/usa/us-missile-defense-aws-811/.
17. Committee on an Assessment of Concepts and Systems for U.S. Boost-Phase Missile
Defense in Comparison to Other Alternatives, Making Sense of Ballistic Missile Defense (Wash-
ington, DC: National Research Council, National Academy of Sciences, National Academies
Press, 2012), https://www.nap.edu/read/13189/chapter/1.
18. George N. Lewis and eodore A. Postol, “e Astonishing National Academy of
Sciences Missile Defense Report,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 20 September 2012, http://
thebulletin.org/astonishing-national-academy-sciences-missile-defense-report.
19. Rebecca Slayton, Arguments that Count: Physics, Computing, and Missile Defense,
1949–2012 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2013), 188–97.
20. Superior treatment of technical, political, and economic challenges to US and NATO
plans for European missile defenses is provided in Steven J. Whitmore and John R. Deni,
NATO Missile Defense and the European Phased Adaptive Approach: e Implications of Burden
Sharing and the Underappreciated Role of the U.S. Army (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College,
October 2013).
21. For US and NATO missile defense plans, see LTG Patrick J. O’Reilly, USA, director,
Missile Defense Agency, “Ballistic Missile Defense Overview” (presentation, 10th Annual
Missile Defense Conference, Washington, DC, 26 March 2012, https://mostlymissiledefense
.les.wordpress.com/2013/06/bmd-update-oreilly-march-2012.pdf.
22. Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation.
23. See Karen Kaya, “NATO Missile Defense and the View from the Front Line,” Joint
Force Quarterly 71 (4th Quarter 2013): 84–89, http://ndupress.ndu.edu/JFQ/Joint-Force
-Quarterly-71/; John F. Morton and George Galdorisi, “Any Sensor, Any Shooter: Toward an
Aegis BMD Global Enterprise,” Joint Force Quarterly 67 (4th Quarter 2012): 85–90, http://
Stephen J. Cimbala
114 S S Q ♦ F 2017
ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-67/JFQ-67_85-90_Morton-Galdorisi.pdf;
and Frank A. Rose, deputy assistant secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verication and Com-
pliance, “Growing Global Cooperation on Ballistic Missile Defense, Remarks as Prepared,
Berlin, Germany,” 10 September 2012, http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/197547.htm.
24. For example, see RIA Novosti, “Moscow Needs More ‘Predictability’ in NATO Missile
Defense Plans,” Sputnik News, 23 October 2013, https://sptnkne.ws/eHdh.
25. See Kevin Ayers, “Expanding Zeus’s Shield: A New Approach for eater Ballistic
Missile Defense in the Asia-Pacic Region,” Joint Force Quarterly 84 (1st Quarter 2017):
24–31, http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-84/jfq-84_24-31_Ayers.pdf,
for a discussion of challenges and opportunities. See also essays in e Asia-Pacic Century:
Challenges and Opportunities, ed. Adam Lowther (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University
Press, April 2013).
26. Pavel Podvig, “What to Do about Tactical Nuclear Weapons,” Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, 25 February 2010, https://web.archive.org/web/20100504022115/http://www
.thebulletin.org:80/web-edition/columnists/pavel-podvig/what-to-do-about-tactical-nuclear
-weapons.
27. Slayton, Arguments that Count, 199–226. Slayton oers pertinent historical perspective.
See also Keir Giles with Andrew Monaghan, European Missile Defense and Russia (Carlisle, PA:
Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press, July 2014); and Andrew Futter, Bal-
listic Missile Defence and US National Security Policy: Normalization and Acceptance after the
Cold War (New York: Routledge, 2013).
28. For example, at the Geneva disarmament conference in March 2017, Lieutenant
General Viktor Poznikhir, deputy head of the Main Operations Department of the Russian
General Sta, averred that deployment of US missile defenses “ruins the current system of
international security” and that “the United States hopes to gain strategic advantage by down-
grading the deterrence potentials of Russia and China. is may cause serious eects in the
eld of security.” Poznikhir, cited in “Military Expert Warns US ABMs Can Detect Any
Missile Shield, Even Russian Ones,” TASS, 28 March 2017, http://tass.com/defense/937949.
29. For example, the possibility of “left-of-launch” techniques for interfering with enemy
missile launches before missiles actually reach the launch pad or during the launch itself. See
David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “Trump Inherits a Secret Cyberwar against North
Korean Missiles,” New York Times, 4 March 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/04/...
/north-korea-missile-program-sabotage.html.
30. Morton and Galdorisi, “Any Sensor, Any Shooter.”
31. For US and NATO missile defense plans under the European phased adaptive approach,
see Kaya, “NATO Missile Defense,” and O’Reilly, “Ballistic Missile Defense Overview.”
32. Paul Bracken, e Second Nuclear Age: Strategy, Danger, and the New Power Politics
(New York: Henry Holt–Times Books, 2012), 260–61. For an illustration of some new ap-
proaches, see the collaborative work between RAND and the Korea Institute for Defense
Analyses in Paul K. Davis, Peter Wilson, Jeongeun Kim, and Junho Park, “Deterrence and
Stability for the Korean Peninsula,” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 23, no. 1 (Spring 2016):
1–23, http://www.kida.re.kr.
Disclaimer
e views and opinions expressed or implied in SSQ are those of the
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